Monday, December 03, 2012

That's Alotta Money

Here is a slide from a Northstar Realty Finance Corp (NRF) presentation to a securities conference last summer:




NRF sponsors the Northstar Real Estate Income Trust, a non-traded mortgage REIT.  Interesting to see how much money a sponsor expects to make from its non-traded REIT.  NRF, according to the footnotes, expects to earn 3% per year on equity capital from asset management, origination, acquisition and disposition fees.  I don't see any expectations for potential incentive fees.  Wait, there is no incentive when the sponsor is earning 3% per year!

The slide above is public information and was extracted from an 8-K that NRF filed with the SEC on September 5, 2012.   You can search NRF's filings to see the entire presentation.

Sunday, December 02, 2012

Top Heavy BDCs

This article in InvestmentNews on business development companies (BDCs) sounded promising - and made its way around email inboxes last week - but ultimately didn't provide much new information.  The article's title states that BDC sales are on a tear, but sales in BDCs are top heavy.  According to the article's table, two firms Franklin Square and CNL, accounted for 93% of all BDC sales in the third quarter, and Franklin Square alone accounted for 63% of sales.  Sponsors may be rushing to offer BDCs, but they better have a plan to take sales away from Franklin Square, because its dominance is unrelenting.

The following sentence/paragraph at the end of the article needs clarification:
BDCs invest in the debt and equity of small to mid-market companies, with the instruments ranging from the senior secured level to below investment grade or “junk,” an asset class typically not available to retail investors.
All BDCs invest in debt, and to a much lesser extent equity, of non-rated, small and middle-market private companies.  Whether the debt is senior secured or unsecured subordinated debt, it's debt from companies below investment grade.  Senior secured debt issued by a "junk" company is still considered "junk" debt.

Finally, what's up with Corporate Capital Trust's 149% payout?  I guess I have some homework.

Thursday, November 29, 2012

Twinkie Brain

The executives at Hostess have been eating too many Twinkies and Ding-Dongs.  The sugar-brained executives had the nerve to ask the bankruptcy court for permission to pay themselves $1.8 million in bonuses or the executives won't stay on through Hostess's bankruptcy liquidation.  They bankrupt a company, ruin an iconic American brand, and cost 18,000 people their jobs right before the Holidays, then want a bonus for this stellar performance.  Really?  Where's the accountability?  Don't let the door hit their fat Ho-Ho asses on the way out.  Pay them in stale Little Debbie's instead. 

Getting Ready to Wait

Cole Credit Property Trust II (CCPT II), in response to its now year-and-a-half-old liquidity event proclamation, disclosed in an 8-K earlier this month that "numerous potential bidders" are looking at all or part of the REIT.  The 8-K also said that Cole has asked the bidders to submit any offers by the end of November, which is fast approaching.  I, for one, am not delaying Holiday shopping plans waiting around to analyze an early-, mid-, late- or post-December 8-K filing detailing a liquidity event for CCPT II.  I'll believe it when I see it.

Is it me or is the "or part" language interesting?  Except as I discuss below, I'm skeptical that Cole would sell CCPT II in three parts - single tenant retail, multi-tenant retail and office and industrial.  CCPT II's prior disclosures have mentioned partial sales before, but this is the first time three distinct portfolio sectors have been identified.   A partial sale would be messy and time consuming.   The second best scenario for Cole is an all-cash sale where it can try get as much money as possible recycled into its two current non-traded REITs.  In my opinion, the best option for investors is one where they receive full, immediate liquidity  - none of this staged, multi-period listing nonsense - while keeping the option to continue receiving a high distribution.

I have stated before that I think Cole will try and pull a WP Carey and provide liquidity to investors while keeping control of CCPT II's assets. Slicing the portfolio into thirds makes this hypothesis / guess less a stretch.  Cole's Corporate Income Trust can buy the office assets while Cole Credit Property Trust IV buys the retail assets.  This is the best scenario for Cole.  Heads Cole wins, tails Cole wins. 

A commenter in my last post on CCPT II stated correctly that in a complete asset sale Cole would not have to internalize its advisor.  While true, I don't see Cole, or any non-traded REIT sponsor that hasn't waived an internalization fee, selling a portfolio without negotiating some form of liquidation payday, whether through internalization or some other form.   Cole didn't hire two investment bankers for nothing. 

Tuesday, November 27, 2012

Archstone's Cobbled Road

The Archstone saga has been strange.  For months last year and into this year, bankrupt Lehman battled Equity Residential in bankruptcy count for control of Archstone, a large apartment owner and operator.  (Lehman bought Archstone near the end of the credit crisis.)  Lehman finally won control of Archstone and planned an IPO of Archstone stock to raise cash to repay creditors.  The IPO process started last summer.  Yesterday, it was announced (via Bloomberg) that old nemesis Equity Residential, along with AvalonBay - the two largest listed apartment REITs  - are buying Archstone for $6.5 billion.  Lehman's creditors get $2.45 billion of the $6.5 billion.

From reading the article, I figure Lehman's value for Archstone was $5.66 billion when it finally won control earlier this year.  Archstone's $6.5 billion price tag is a solid premium for Lehman, especially since the prospects of the IPO were not assured, but it was a tough road.

Thursday, November 08, 2012

Good News / Bad News?

I try to stay away from politics on this blog, but one thing I noticed after Tuesday's election was how wrong some of the professional pundits were in their pre-election predictions.  If so many pundits can make shot-in-the-dark guesses why can't I?  I can't help but wonder whether Cole Credit Property Trust III's successful sale of the Microsoft Property is good news before some unpleasant news on Cole Credit Property Trust II's (CCPT II) pending liquidation.  CCPT II announced in the summer of 2011 that it would seek a liquidity event within twelve months.  This date came and went with no announcement. 

In late August 2012, CCPT II filed an 8-K announcing that it had hired two investment bankers.  This was good news, and a step forward towards liquidation, but there is still no news on an exit strategy nearly three months later.  I won't believe Cole is serious about liquidity until it waives any internalization fees.  Wells REIT II waived internalization fees earlier this year, and KBS REIT II waived internalization fees this fall.  These were significant developments for the non-traded REIT industry, and a continued referendum on the stigma of internalization fees.  The longer Cole is quiet on this huge potential payday, the less convinced I am that Cole is serious about CCPT II liquidity or foregoing an egregious internalization fee.

There is another factor that I'm sure plays against the liquidity and internalization fee waiver:  the increasing deficit between CCPT II's 8.0% preferred return and its 6.25% current distribution.  This figure grows daily, diminishing Cole's chances of sharing in liquidation profits.  I am going to get wonky, but follow the premise.  CCPT II is paying a 6.25% distribution, and its annual preferred return, or hurdle rate, is 8.0% per year.  When the REIT provides investors a return of capital and an 8.0% per year return, its advisor shares in 10% of all additional proceeds. (The 10.0% incentive amount is less than many other non-traded REITs.)  Any annual shortfall essentially gets added to the initial share price, increasing the price needed before Cole is paid its incentive fee.  The current annual difference for CCPT II is $.175 per share per year ($.80 perferred return, less $.625 current distribution).  CCPT II has never paid a distribution equal to its preferred return, so the annual deficit has been added to the initial share price since the initial distribution in late 2005. 

The longer Cole waits the bigger the hurdle becomes.  I figure the approximate accumulated difference at $1.0625 per share, through September 2012.  This requires any liquidation event price to exceed $11.0625 before Cole begins to share in its 10% incentive fee.  (I'm sure CCPT II's investment bankers have spent considerable time figuring the exact share price where CCPT II's advisor starts to receive its incentive.)  I am not going to predict a liquidation value for CCPT II, I'll let the market determine that, but I will state that the longer CCPT II waits to liquidate the more the deficit grows.  Time is not Cole's friend. 

(CCPT II pays its advisor an asset management fee of .25% of its aggregate asset value, which is low compared to many other REITs, and not in my opinion, a strong financial incentive to delay a liquidation.)

This brings us back to the internalization fee.  This is a big potential payday, which can run into the tens to hundreds of millions of dollars, especially for a REIT the size of CCPT II.  If Cole thinks an incentive fee is out of reach, an internalization fee looks all the more enticing.  Wells REIT II has a similar dynamic, maybe more so than CCPT II - a long-term deficit between its distribution and its preferred return - and it waived its internalization fee.  It was the right decision, and it met industry expectations. 

Political pundits are in a safe bubble and none have any repercussions - the networks will keep calling no matter how wrong their predictions.  I hope Cole isn't in a delusional bubble where it believes it can slip a large internalization fee past investors.  That would be bad for Cole and bad for the industry.  Cole needs to build on the success of its Microsoft Property transaction, not ruin it with bad news on CCPT II's liquidation.  Unlike the political pundits, I hope I'm wrong.

Tuesday, November 06, 2012

The Acquisition

Non-traded real estate investment trusts buy and sell (mostly buy) properites every day, and no one transaction seems more memorable than any other.  But then in the summer of 2010 Cole Credit Property Trust III (CCPT III) purchased a $310 million office building, and it instantly became an acquisition everyone was talking about.  The building, located in a suburb of Seattle, was over 95% leased to Microsoft, and I know it as the Microsoft Property.  Cole has been justifying the acquisition of the Microsoft Property ever since.

Other non-traded REIT sponsors whispered that they too had reviewed the property, but had passed on it because it was too expensive, giving a strong implication that Cole overpaid.  Cole was accused of style drift - what else could it be if a retail-oriented REIT spent so much money on a single office property?  You must be ever-vigilant for the horror of style drift in the strict, stratified world of non-traded REITs. 

CCPT III has sold the most infamous property in recent non-traded REIT history, giving Cole some justification and vindication.  The Microsoft Property, which was purchased for $310 million, was sold for $375 million.  Cole's spite at the industry seeped into its press release (emphasis added):
“When our experienced real estate team brought this opportunity to us in the summer of 2010, despite industry naysayers, we felt this acquisition would be an excellent fit for our growing portfolio of mission-critical corporate properties,” said Marc Nemer, Cole’s president and chief executive officer. “Today, not only have we seen a 21% increase in the property's value, but we were able to deliver a return of 38% on the equity invested, creating significant value in the portfolio for the benefit of our shareholders.”
Now that the Microsoft Property has been sold, the industry can focus its full attention on the ever-pending liquidity options for Cole Credit Property Trust II.

On a serious note, CCPT III paid a pre-payment penalty of $12.8 million as part of the Microsoft Property sale. The property had a $156 million mortgage that was repaid at closing. I figure the pre-payment penalty was 8.2% of the outstanding balance on the mortgage. Is is me or does this seem like a high percentage?

Tuesday, October 30, 2012

Home Values' Continued Recovery

The S&P / Case-Shiller home price index is out and prices rose 2% in August on a year-over-year basis.  Here is a Bloomberg article and a Calculated Risk blog post on the increase.  In a report full of positive housing news, this sentence on Phoenix from the Calculated Risk post stood out:
“Phoenix continues to lead the home price recovery. It recorded its fourth consecutive month of double-digit positive annual returns with a +18.8% rate for August."

Thursday, October 25, 2012

Par For The Course

The business development company, Corporate Capital, Trust just filed an 8-K and Form 497 this morning.  At September 30, 2012, its portfolio was purchased at 99.9% of par.  The syndicated loan market for small and medium sized private companies is (obviously) fully priced.

Tuesday, October 02, 2012

Doing The Right Thing

In a filing last week, KBS REIT II's advisor announced its waiving any internalization fee in the event the REIT becomes self-managed through a merger/consolidation with its advisor.  This is another example of a large, non-traded REIT sponsor foregoing a potentially large - but controversial - payday that typically comes at the expense of investors.  I'm wondering whether this is the first step in KBS REIT II's process to provide liquidity to investors.

Separately, Wells Core REIT announced that it will close its offering next summer when its original offering term ends.  A follow-on offering would have extended the REIT's offering period an additional two years, making it a total of five years.  Wells REIT II has raised nearly $400 million in investor equity, and has approximately ten months remaining to complete its offering.  It's good that Core is skipping the ugly share revaluation process - and subsequent marketing push - that has further stained the non-traded REIT this year.   

Friday, September 28, 2012

Friday Reading - Archstone IPO

An article from Bloomberg on Archstone Inc.'s potential $3 bilion IPO, the largest IPO since Facebook earlier this year.  The article discusses Archstone and Lehman Brothers, and has performance information on various REIT sectors:
The companies (apartment REITs) have been the worst performers this year among all other publicly traded REITs that own commercial property, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Retail landlords have returned 25 percent, compared with 12 percent for owners of office buildings.

Apartment stocks surged after REIT landlords increased rents by 19 percent between the market bottom at the end of 2009 through the second quarter of 2012, according to Dallas-based Axiometrics Inc. While rents are projected to keep climbing through 2017, the rate of annual growth peaked in the second quarter of 2011 at 5.1 percent. Rents are on pace to rise about 4 percent nationally this year, Axiometrics said.

Thursday, September 27, 2012

I'm Not Dead

It's been a few weeks since my last post.  More immediate work has superseded blogging, but I'll be back soon.  In the meantime....


Thursday, September 06, 2012

Realty Income / ARCT Links

Here are some links to articles on Realty Income Corporation's acquisition of American Realty Capital Trust:

InvestmentNews

GlobeSt

Reuters

In a disturbing development, if you view the ARCT news on yahoo.finance.com, you'll notice that multiple law firms have initiated "investigations" into the Realty Income / ARCT transaction, trying to drum up litigation business.

ARCT Acquired By Realty Income Corporation


American Realty Capital Trust (ARCT) announced today that it is being acquired by Realty Income Corporation (O).  Realty Income is buying ARCT with stock at a fixed ratio of .2874 shares of Realty Income for every share of ARCT.  According to this morning's press release, the transaction is worth $2.95 billion, or $12.21 per share to ARCT investors, based on Realty Income's closing stock price yesterday of $42.48.  The combined market value of the two companies is approximately $7.5 billion.  None of the current ARCT management is moving to Realty Income Corporation.

The transaction is expected to close in the fourth quarter of 2012, or early in the first quarter of 2013.  Upon the close of the transaction, current ARCT investors will receive Realty Income stock in exchange for their ARCT shares.  Realty Income is an actively traded NYSE stock, and its price is going to vary, so the merger value will fluctuate until the acquisition closes.  The conversion ratio of .2874 Realty Income shares for each ARCT share is fixed.  I haven't read this in any press release or news article on the transaction, but I calculate that an original ARCT investor (shares purchased at $10.00) will see a drop in yield from the current 7.1% to 5.6%, after the transaction closes and after Realty Income implements the $.13 per share dividend increase announced in the press release.

Realty Income's purchase of ARCT is not a liquidity event.  ARCT listed all its shares on NASDAQ in early March, and this was ARCT's liquidity event for investors.  ARCT shares will stay fully liquid before the merger, and after the merger the new Realty Income shares will be fully liquid.

Realty Income is a net lease real estate investment trust (REIT).  It listed on the NYSE in 1994, when multiple RIC limited partnerships were "rolled-up" to form Realty Income Corporation.  Realty Income has trademarked the term Monthly Dividend Company, and according to its website it has raised dividends 67 times since it listed in 1994, and has seen dividend growth of 101.5% since 1994. 

ARCT shareholders that purchased shares in ARCT's primary offering at $10.00 per share, and still own their shares, have a 22% premium based the transaction values in the press release.  ARCT shareholders, upon completion of ARCT's acquisition by Realty Income, become part of an established company nearly four times as large as ARCT as a stand-along company.  As noted previously, the transaction is not a liquidity event, and ARCT investors do not have to sell their Realty Income shares after the merger is complete. 

It's hard not to see the transaction as positive for shareholders, even with the drop in yield.   Realty Income is now the largest net lease REIT has a long history of paying and raising its dividend.  Realty Income's stock chart from its 1994 inception is below:

Chart forRealty Income Corp. (O)



Tuesday, September 04, 2012

Dirty Rotten Royalty Misdeeds

My dad always said that there were more horses' asses in the world than horses.  This article from Bloomberg reveals that the oil and gas industry is the Kentucky Derby without the horses.  In a response to falling gas prices, oil and gas companies have been re-interpreting royalty contracts and have stated deducting certain costs, including transporting, marketing and processing.  This means that royalty owners receive less income. Owners of an oil and gas royalty interest receive a fixed percentage of the oil and gas revenue produced from a particular lease, and in many cases the royalties are paid from gross revenue before the deduction of expenses.  The drop in the price of natural gas has lead to gas operators to look for ways minimize the impact, and one of the ways is to re-visit their royalty contacts: 
Deducting costs for processing, transporting and marketing gas before royalties are calculated can reduce the amount producers owe by 25 percent to 50 percent. About one in five landowners in Texas have signed contracts specifying that producers pay them based on a price before those costs are deducted, said Tom Hazlewood, an appraiser of royalty leases whose business reviews hundreds of properties annually for tax purposes.

For the same gas from the same well under the same contract terms, Thornton, the Texas accountant, says she has been paid about 25 percent more for her gas by Plains Exploration & Production Co. (PXP), which in 2008 bought a 20 percent stake in Chesapeake’s acreage in the Louisiana Haynesville shale formation.

The two companies pay her in separate checks, and she said she discovered the cost deductions when Plains paid her back for expenses it had been subtracting since 2010. Chesapeake has not refunded any costs, she said. Hance Myers, a Plains spokesman, declined to comment.

In August 2011, when gas prices had fallen 14 percent from the year earlier and were sliding toward a 10-year intraday low of $1.902 in April, Chesapeake notified royalty owners in North Texas that it would begin deducting costs from royalties.

The decision came after Chesapeake partnered with Total SA (FP) in 2010 in a $2.25 billion deal that gave the French oil company a 25 percent stake in Chesapeake’s wells in the region. Chesapeake reviewed lease terms after Total said it wanted to deduct costs, Henry Hood, Chesapeake’s general counsel, told the Fort Worth Star-Telegram newspaper in an Aug. 10, 2011 story.

On Jan. 24, Chesapeake notified landowners in Pennsylvania of its intent to deduct costs, citing a March 2010 state supreme court ruling that confirmed deductions were allowed.
The oil and gas industry is full of conflicts of interest and intra-company dealings.  I would suspect that in many cases the expenses the oil and gas company are charging royalty owners are paid to an affiliate company.  Contracts are designed to protect people, and it's wrong for big oil and gas companies to renege on their contractual obligations just because prices dropped.   Chesapeake is not the only company re-interpreting its contracts, but but it appears like the poster child for what's wrong in the oil and gas industry.

A Growing Chorus

Here is a must-read InvestmentNews article on the issues surrounding non-traded real estate investment trust (REIT) valuations.  This blog has been railing for months on this issue and it's about time the conversation expanded.  The article discusses four non-traded REITs - Industrial Income Trust, Strategic Storage Trust, Steadfast Income REIT and TNP Strategic Retail Trust - and their valuation methodologies.  The methodologies vary among the REITs, but are all dependent upon input from the REITs' advisors and require the REITs' boards' approvals. 

The issues addressed in the article are important and are not going away.  The market will see more re-valuations in the coming months as big named REITs like Griffin-American Healthcare REIT II and Hines Global REIT prepare secondary offerings.

There a few issues that deserve a follow-up article by author, Bruce Kelly.  The article only briefly touches on the short-term sales impact of the revaluations.  Industrial Income Trust and Strategic Storage saw huge sales increases between the time the new value and share price was announced and the time the new price went effective.  After the reprice, equity sales for both REITs are lower than before the revaluation was announced (although the post-revaluation time period has been limited).  The whole revaluation process smells like a marketing exercise to get a large sales surge. 

I still don't understand how a non-traded REIT can revalue its shares and then sell shares with a load at the new revalued price.  What happens to the REIT's offering costs?  The offer price should be the new value per share, plus offering costs.  A REIT's load is real and must be added to its net asset value per share.  This is how business development companies (BDCs) operate.   BDCs are required to determine a quarterly net asset value per share, and then add the sales load costs to arrive at an offer price.  In this respect, non-traded REITs are no different.  The credibility surrounding non-traded REIT valuations is suspect to begin with, and the valuations become specious when the load is ignored.

Monday, August 27, 2012

CCPT II - Exit Inches Forward

Cole Credit Property Trust II (CCPT II) just filed a letter it is sending to financial advisors.  The bulk the body of the letter is below:
Last summer, we communicated to you that we believed we may be moving into a healthy market environment for a liquidity event for Cole Credit Property Trust II, Inc. (CCPT II), and would be evaluating options to take this investment program full cycle. We want to provide you with an update on this important initiative.

Maximizing shareholder value is our highest priority, and the timing of any exit strategy is crucial. High-quality, income-oriented real estate portfolios like CCPT II are an attractive asset class in the present market environment. As you can imagine, maximizing value in an exit event is a long and complicated process, and the CCPT II Board of Directors and its advisors have been working hard to select the option that is best calculated to produce optimal results for our shareholders. Premature disclosure about the types of transactions under consideration can be problematic for both legal and business reasons.

While we are limited regarding our discussion of specifics at this time, we can report that the CCPT II Board engaged Morgan Stanley and UBS Investment Bank in March 2012, after an extensive investment banking interview process, to move as expeditiously as possible toward a successful exit event for CCPT II. The CCPT II Board is currently working extensively with Morgan Stanley and UBS Investment Bank on a few concrete options to create a successful exit transaction, and we hope to be in a position to share details with you soon.

CCPT II announced in June of 2011 that it would have an exit strategy within the next twelve months. That date passed quietly.  CCPT II, according to the letter, is working on liquidity options, and has engaged two investment banking firms to move the process forward.  It sounds like some form of announcement on exit strategies will be made "soon."  While the letter does not provide any new, concrete exit news, CCPT II working with two investment bankers is a positive step for those wanting a liquidity event. 

Friday, August 24, 2012

Trying To Find The Outrage

I have had several people send me this InvestmentNews article on a Behringer Harvard fund, Strategic Opportunity Fund I, which is to disclose to investors today that it has no remaining equity, as the fund's debt exceeds the value of its properties.   I don't know much about the fund other than what I read in the article.  The situation is unfortunate, but I am not surprised or outraged.  The fund made leverages investments in value opportunity real estate at the top the market.

This paragraph, which is a paraphrased quote from a respected independent analyst, is unclear to me:
First, while many real estate deals known as TICs – or tenant in common exchanges – have gone under since the collapse in real estate, only one commercial property is contained in a TIC offering, he noted. The Behringer Harvard fund had six properties.  
The paragraph reads to me that Strategic Opportunity Fund I invested in properties along side Behringer Harvard's tenant in common investors.   So, the fund partially owns its six properties with various individual investors owning the rest of the properties.  If I am correct, the future looks messy.  Multiple owners through the fund and various TIC offerings complicates matters, as differing personalities and investments objectives are going to clash trying to resolve the issues facing the properties.

Thursday, August 23, 2012

Housing Continues to Improve

The housing data I have been reading continues to show an improving housing market.  I have not linked to all the articles I have been reading, but there were a few points this morning worth noting.  First is an article from Calculated Risk on new home sales.  New home sales were at an adjusted annual rate of 372,000, a nearly 25.3% increase from July 2011.   Released with new home sale data was the July monthly supply of new homes, which dropped to 4.6 months, a decrease from June's 4.8 months, and well below the average of 6 months. 

This Bloomberg article reports on a Federal Housing Finance Agency report that states that US housing prices increased 1.8% in the second quarter from the previous quarter, and 3% over the past year.  The second quarter saw the biggest price increase since the fourth quarter of 2005.  The report also noted that the number of homeowners with homes worth less than the value of their mortgages fell by 400,000 over the same second quarter.

Finally, from last weekend, here is an article from the North County Times (via Calculated Risk), which covers northern San Diego County.  The article dissects the myth that a wave of new foreclosures is going to flood the market and drive down home prices.  Fewer new foreclosures, more short sales, declining bank-owned inventory, and rising home prices are preventing widespread distressed sales.  While the article is San Diego County specific, I would imagine the same dynamics are playing out in Phoenix, Las Vegas, California's Inland Empire and other markets hit hard by the housing crisis.

Tuesday, August 21, 2012

Ping Pong Ball Properties

KBS REIT I sold a portfolio of properties it foreclosed upon back to the company that originally owned the portfolio, according to the linked Bloomberg article.  I have not seen a filing from KBS REIT I on the transaction.  The 115-property transaction is for $470 million in cash: 
Gramercy, in a joint venture with Garrison Investment Group, will acquire the properties for $470 million in cash and 6 million of its shares, valued at $15 million, the New York- based REIT said today in a statement. Gramercy and Garrison each hold a 50 percent interest in the venture.

The portfolio comprises 5.6 million square feet (520,000 square meters) of office space, 81 percent of which is leased to to Bank of America Corp. through June 2023. The buildings were previously part of Gramercy’s realty division and were transferred to KBS in September as part of a deal to settle $549.7 million in mortgage debt.
The 115-property portfolio represents only a portion of the properties that were acquired through the settlement of KBS REIT I's mezzanine loan investment.  The following is language from KBS REIT I's 10-Q, which was released last week, describing the entire Gramercy portfolio and settlement:
On September 1, 2011, the Company, through indirect wholly owned subsidiaries (collectively, “KBS”), entered into a Collateral Transfer and Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) with, among other parties, GKK Stars Acquisition LLC (“GKK Stars”), the wholly owned subsidiary of Gramercy Capital Corp. (“Gramercy”) that indirectly owned the Gramercy real estate portfolio, to effect the orderly transfer of certain assets and liabilities of the Gramercy real estate portfolio to KBS in satisfaction of certain debt obligations under a mezzanine loan owed by wholly owned subsidiaries of Gramercy to KBS (the “GKK Mezzanine Loan”) . The Settlement Agreement resulted in the transfer of the equity interests in certain subsidiaries of Gramercy (the “Equity Interests”) that indirectly owned or, with respect to a limited number of properties, held a leasehold interest in, 867 properties (the “GKK Properties”), including 576 bank branch properties and 291 office buildings, operations centers and other properties. As of December 15, 2011, GKK Stars had transferred all of the Equity Interests to the Company, giving the Company title to or, with respect to a limited number of GKK Properties, a leasehold interest in, 867 GKK Properties as of that date.

A Disturbing Situation

Here is a Bloomberg article on banks that are buying Treasuries rather than making loans.  The article's first few paragraphs offer one reason why the economy is growing slowly:

As deposits increased 3.3 percent to $8.88 trillion in the two months ended July 31, business lending rose 0.7 percent to $7.11 trillion, Federal Reserve data show. The record gap of $1.77 trillion has expanded 15 percent since May, the biggest similar-period gain since July, 2010. Banks have already bought $136.4 billion in Treasury and government agency debt this year, more than double the $62.6 billion in all of 2011, pushing their holdings to an all-time high of $1.84 trillion.

Faced with a slowing U.S. economy, unemployment above 8 percent for more than three years and regulations forcing them to hold more and higher-quality assets, banks are lending at below pre-recession levels. The bond purchases help explain why even after rising this month, Treasury 10-year note rates are about half the 3.5 percent median forecast of 43 economists in a Bloomberg survey a year ago. 
The banks should make loans, not invest in Treasuries.  These banks better be good bond traders.  When interest rates move up the crush of banks selling Treasuries is going to make the bankers wish they had made loans.

Thursday, August 16, 2012

A Valuation Too, Too Far

I was wrong.  I wrote yesterday that the scant disclosure surrounding CNL Lifestyle's share valuation was too much for me.  Lifestyle has now been surpassed by the valuation released today by TNP Strategic Retail.  Strategic Retail is in the midst of its equity offering period and has determined an net asset value of $10.40 per share.  I'll let you read today's 8-K filing yourself.  The disclosure is better than CNL Lifestyle's, and yesterday's anonymous, Discounted Cash Flow-loving commenter should be ecstatic with the Strategic Retail's valuation methodology.

The REIT was valued by its advisor, but it obtained a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval by seeking the valuation consulting services of Duff & Phelps.    I don't read that Duff & Phelps valued Strategic Retail's assets, but I'll let you decide:
Our board of directors determined the estimated per share value in its sole discretion and is ultimately and solely responsible for establishing the estimated value of a share of our common stock. Our board of directors did, however, engage the services of Duff & Phelps LLC, or Duff & Phelps, an independent valuation firm, to conduct valuation consulting services regarding all of our real estate assets. We believe there are no material conflicts of interest between Duff & Phelps, on the one hand, and us, our advisor and our directors or officers, on the other hand. 
Fees matter.  Strategic Retail offers its shares at $10.00 per share.  From this is deducted 10% in commissions and selling costs, and up to another 3% in organization fees, which the REIT estimates will be 1.75%.  This amount of front-end costs is typical for non-traded REITs.   The $10.00 per share purchase price becomes a net $8.83 (using 1.75% in organization fees) that is being invested in properties.  I did not include the 2.50% acquisition fee paid on the price of each acquisition, which includes debt, and the 1.0% finance fee on the amount of any outstanding debt, which the REIT instituted earlier this year.  So, by reading today's valuation we're to believe that a net investment of $8.83 today is worth $10.40.  Fees matter.

Spanish and Italian Freeze

Here is another article from last weekend, this one from the Financial Times. The article details how Spanish and Italian commercial real estate transactions nearly stopped in the second quarter:
Only three property transactions were registered in Spain during the second quarter, down from 58 deals in the previous quarter. In Italy the slide was even more pronounced, with just two buildings being traded during the period, down from 56, according to data from Real Capital Analytics.
The article is a short, sobering read. 

The Economic Impact of Energy

Here is an article from Bloomberg on the economic impact of oil and gas development.  The article was published last weekend.  This paragraph below presents some encouraging stats and projections:
U.S. energy supplies have been transformed in less than a decade, driven by advances in technology, and the economic implications are only beginning to be understood. U.S. natural gas production will expand to a record this year and oil output swelled in July to its highest point since 1999. Citigroup Inc. (C) estimated in a March report that a “reindustrialization” of America could add as many as 3.6 million jobs by 2020 and increase the gross domestic product by as much as 3 percent.
The article states that US oil imports have dropped 17% sine 2005.  That is good news. The entire article is worth reading.

Wednesday, August 15, 2012

A Valuation Too Far

CNL Lifestyle Properties released its second quarter 10-Q yesterday.  Lifestyle disclosed deep in the 10-Q a new share valuation of $7.31 per share and a distribution reduction.  A drop in the distribution (from 6.25% to 4.25%) was not unexpected based on previous disclosures from Lifestyle.  The 27% drop in value was not unexpected either, despite the proclamation in June by the REIT's CEO that Lifestyle would steer clear of a sharp drop in valuation (I'll let you decide whether 27% is "sharp").   More disturbing than the distribution cut or value loss was Lifestyle's weak valuation methodology.  It mocks investors and broker / dealers*.

Lifestyle describes its methodology below:
In determining an estimated fair value of the Company’s shares, the Board of Directors considered various analyses and information, a portion of which was provided by the Company’s advisor. In preparing its value estimate, the Company also consulted an independent valuation advisor.
The independent valuation advisor was not disclosed, nor was the scope of its work.  "Consult" can mean many things, but it doesn't mean that the third party firm valued the REIT's assets.  The value was determined by REIT's advisor, and it used a 10-year discounted cash flow analysis.  This a discounted cash flow methodology that involves significant assumptions about future revenues and expenses.  The REIT gives its weighted average growth rate but no information on its expense growth.   A large portion of Lifestyle's debt matures over the next five years, and the assumptions  made for repaying or refinancing this debt would play into the valuation  Lifestyle has had issues with a number of its properites since its inception, so I'd question whether a linear, assumption-based cash flow analysis is the most appropriate methodology.  (Lifestyle did not assign a premium for enterprise value or portfolio aggregation.) 

The valuations for non-traded REITs are getting more and more unbelievable, and Lifestyle's internal valuation, to me, is one valuation too far.  Broker / dealers need to call foul and demand independent valuations**.  Non-traded REIT sponsors are not going to stop these self-serving internal valuations until forced.  The non-traded REIT's use of an independent consultant or advisor is not good enough.  Dropping the name of a third party firm when the actual valuation is done by the REIT's advisor is a joke.   As I have noted before, there are only a few valuation methodologies, so having a third party valuation firm affirm a methodology is not the same as having a third party firm calculate the valuation.  Investors and broker / dealers are the ones harmed by nonsense valuations.  Non-traded REIT sponsors, whether too desperate or thick to realize it, will ultimately be hurt, too.

*  Lifestyle is externally advised by an affiliate.  It does not appear that the advisor will be impacted by the new, lower valuation.  The advisor receives an asset management fee of 1% of the purchase price of the REIT's real estate and principal amount of any mortgage assets.  This fee is not impacted by the new valuation because its based on the purchase price of the assets not Lifestyle's new asset value.  Investors just received a 27% reduction in their investment value, and had 32% chopped from their distribution, but Lifestyle's advisor's income stays steady.   

** For an independent valuation done right, look at last fall's valuation by Wells REIT II, which was completely done by a third party valuation firm.

Wednesday, August 08, 2012

The View Through A Distorted Prism

Here is a must-read InvestmentNews article from last Friday, where Inland Group of Companies CEO Daniel Goodwin discussed Retail Properties of America's (RPAI) investor lawsuit, and its $254.4 million stock offering and listing from earlier this year.  Goodwin's audacity is hard to believe.  I've had to read this article several times, even cross-referencing it to RPAI's filings, to confirm just how obtuse he is.  The point I took from the article is that Inland is upset with RPAI for its low stock price and has not ruled out joining an investor lawsuit against RPAI. Here are a few paragraphs from the article, which I will address below:
In an interview Thursday, Mr. Goodwin was quick to note that Inland has no control over Retail Properties of America.

“Although we are shareholders, we have not managed the REIT for the past four-and-a-half years,” he said.
Inland owns about 2 million shares of the REIT through various businesses, Mr. Goodwin said.

Some members of Inland's board “disagreed with the timing and execution” of the initial public offering, he said.

“Those opinions were largely ignored,” Mr. Goodwin said.
When asked whether Inland would join the class action against Retail Properties of America, Mr. Goodwin said: “We have discussed various potential actions but haven't reached a conclusion. Our interests are clearly aligned with the shareholders.”
RPAI and Inland do have separate management.  In terms of control, Inland had a representative, Brenda G. Gujral, on RPAI's board until mid-May, so Goodwin's control comment only spans a couple of months.  Ms. Gujral is an executive officer of various Inland entities, and I have listed  below an excerpt from RPAI's 8-K disclosing Ms. Gujral's resignation from RPAI, which was after RPAI's listing (my emphasis added):
On May 14, 2012, Brenda G. Gujral resigned as a Director of Retail Properties of America, Inc. (the “Company”) effective on May 31, 2012. Ms. Gujral has confirmed to the Company’s Board of Directors that her resignation was not due to a disagreement with the Company on any matter relating to the Company’s operations, policies or practices. 
If you can believe the filing, it doesn't sound as though Ms. Gujral, and presumably Inland, had any issues with RPAI's listing back in May.   RPAI and Inland operate out of the same building.  It reminds me of a situation where an adult still lives at home with his or her parents.  (Inland Realty Corp (IRC), another Inland REIT that is listed on the NYSE, still offices at Inland's headquarter building, too.)  With RPAI's focus on retail properties and Inland's focus on retail properties, among other property types, it's disingenuous to think that in four years, two teams of executives acquiring, managing, leasing and financing similar properties and working in the same building operated in isolation, especially when one of the teams is due a big payday based on the other's performance.  If Inland joins the investor lawsuit, it should make for some tense trips in the elevator or maybe some road rage in the parking lot.

RPAI used $55 million of its $237 million net IPO proceeds to repay an affiliate of Inland Group.  In 2009 the affiliate made a $50 million investment into a joint venture between it and RPAI.  It's hard to imagine Inland whining about a receiving $55 million for its $50 million investment.  RPAI's IPO proceeds were smaller than anticipated ($254 million compared to an estimated of $350 million), and the amount of IPO proceeds that went to pay down its underwriters' affiliates' debt was less than originally anticipated.  Inland didn't take a discount and received a repayment of its 2009 joint venture investment in full, plus an extra $5 million.

Inland's $50 million joint venture investment in 2009 probably allowed RPAI to refinance $625 million of debt.*  You can't be revisionist in 2012 and question this deal because the credit markets were non-existent in 2009, and it's to Inland's and RPAI's credit that they were able to complete the refinance in the middle of the credit crisis.  I find it incredulous that Goodwin is complaining about an IPO after proceeds from it repaid Inland its joint venture investment plus 10%.  I'm sure RPAI shareholders would jump at the chance for the same return on investment.

In the article Goodwin states that Inland only owns 2 million shares of RPAI stock.  In a blog post earlier this year, I noted that as part of its 2007 internalization, RPAI acquired its former advisor, an affiliate of Inland.  RPAI paid for its advisor with 11.4 million in split-adjusted shares.  I'm not sure what to make of Goodwin's comment that Inland only owns 2 million shares.  If Inland really only owns 2 million shares, I'd like to know what happened to the other 9.4 million shares.

Inland's internalization fee is now worth $114 million, based on the 11.4 million shares and yesterday's closing price of $10.00 per share.  Is Goodwin's complaint about the listing really a complaint about the low list price, which resulted in Inland's internalization fee not being large enough?  (Originally, the internalization fee, based on RPAI's $10.00 offer price, was $375 million.  This was later reduced to $285 million after a lawsuit.)

I fail to see how Inland's interest is aligned with investors.  RPAI gave paid Inland its internationalization fee in stock at a price determined by Inland.  Investors had to pay cash for their shares.   Inland was well-paid throughout the time it managed RPAI.  The internalization fee was a gift, not a performance fee earned for providing a specified return to investors.   I don't feel any sympathy for a gripe about shares not paid for that have dropped in value from $285 million to $114 million.

RPAI's initial public offering was at $8.00 per share, which was well below estimates of $10 to $12 per share.   It's stock closed yesterday at $10.00, up nearly 20% since its listing (while the IPO was at $8.00, RPAI began trading around $8.50 per share).  As far as I know, Inland's shares are subject to the same multi-staged listing as other RPAI shareholders.  Investors in RPAI's original offering have still lost nearly 60% in share price value, but Inland is still $114 million ahead.

* From RPAI's March 12, 2012's S-11:  "In addition, in 2009, in connection with a $625 million debt refinancing transaction, we raised additional capital of $50 million from an affiliate of the Inland Group in exchange for a 23% noncontrolling interest in a newly formed joint venture to which we contributed 55 of our properties."


Monday, August 06, 2012

A Statistic To Watch

Several non-traded business development corporations (BDCs) have raised and invested enough capital that they are reporting meaningful results, and key performance metrics can be analyzed.  One statistic I find important is the average price, as a percentage of par, at which BDCs are buying their investments.  Par for a loan investment, like a bond, is typically the face value of the loan.  For example, if a bank, or BDC, or other entity makes a loan for $100, par is $100, because that is the price the borrower will repay when the loan matures.

When you have a loaded investment, like a non-traded BDC, the ability to purchase investments below par should help to offset the BDC's initial load.  As a simple example, if a BDC purchases a loan for $95 that has a $100 par value, it's buying the loan at 95% of par and the $5 difference earned when the loan matures could help partially recoup the BDC's initial load.

CNL's KKR-sub-advised BDC, Corporate Capital Trust, disclosed in a recent Form 497 filing that it has acquired its $426 million portfolio of investments at an average price of 100.1% of par.  So, its loan portfolio will mature at the price the BDC paid for the loans, assuming the loans are held to maturity.  There are other factors that could help recover or offset the load in this BDC other than just the average price as a percentage of par - skillful use leverage, a change in interest rates, realization of equity participations, or reserving excess interest, to name just a few - but it's an interesting figure to watch over time. 

Just because Corporate Capital Trust paid 100% of par for its investments doesn't mean it can't sell the loans for a premium, or that there are not other ways for the BDC to recover its load.  I need to find the same price-to-par ratio for other non-traded BDCs to determine whether all the BDCs are buying their investments at 100% of par.  

Thursday, August 02, 2012

Internalization Fee Rises Like A Phoenix

No sooner had I declared the internalization fee dead, than it appears that I proclaimed its death too soon.  TNP Strategic Retail Trust filed an 8-K today disclosing that it has amended its advisory agreement between the REIT and its external advisor.  According to the 8-K, the amended advisory agreement will:
Delete in its entirety Section 13 of the Advisory Agreement, which provided, among other things, that before the Company could complete a business combination with the Advisor to become self-administered, certain conditions would have to be satisfied, including (i) the formation of a special committee comprised entirely of the Company’s independent directors, (ii) the receipt of an opinion from a qualified investment banking firm concluding that consideration to be paid to acquire the Advisor was financially fair to the Company’s stockholders and (iii) the approval of the business combination by the Company’s stockholders entitled to vote thereon in accordance with the Company’s charter.
The way I read the above passage is that the REIT's safeguards related to the REIT acquiring its advisor are being removed, which would make charging an internalization fee much easier.  (It would also make the internalization process much faster as a committee, third party report and shareholder vote are being eliminated.)  Remember, an internalization fee is the price that a REIT pays to acquire its external advisor, and this price has historically been paid in REIT stock.  TNP Strategic Retail has not disclosed a management internalization or the cost of an internalization (internalization fee), and the deleted sections from the advisory agreement would not have prevented an internalization fee, but it's apparent to me that some of the REIT's investor protection provisions have been removed.  

The 8-K also disclosed that the REIT's Chief Financial Officer has resigned.  The entire 8-K is worth reading.

Friday, July 27, 2012

A Banal BDC Bash

Here is an article on non-traded business development companies (BDCs) from WealthManagement.com.  It presents some good information but it's mixed with bad information, so read the article carefully.  If you're going to slam a product type, you need to get your facts correct.  

Several times the article refers to non-traded BDCs as private investments. Here is a big quote, the second paragraph of the article:
“In my opinion, brokers should not be selling private anything—private placement, private REIT, private business development corporation—because it limits the flexibility, it limits liquidity, it limits transparency, and it almost always means higher fees internal,” said Joshua Brown, vice president of Investments at Fusion Analytics Investment Partners. “The only reason [non-traded BDCs] get sold is because it’s product and it’s sexy and it’s a way for a broker to get a higher fee for the same dollars that they would put into a public version.”
All the BDCs being offered today, and the ones discussed in the article, are public entities, not private placements.  The disclosure for these public non-traded BDCs is excellent, and should be the same as for traded BDCs.  If you read the SEC filings of non-traded BDCs you get a good sense of how the BDCs are performing.

Financial journalists need to understand the important distinction between non-traded entities and private placements.  Just because an entity is not traded doesn't mean it's a private placement. 

The article points out that many sponsors of non-traded REITs have jumped into the BDC sponsorship business.   This is certainly true, and unfortunately, it's one reason why BDCs and non-traded REITs are lumped together.  Only one sponsor, AR Capital, is managing its BDC portfolio, and it hired an experienced BDC team to build and manage the portfolio, so the real estate guys are not doing double duty learning the leveraged, middle market loan business on the fly.  The typical approach, is for a non-traded REIT sponsor to contract with an experienced sub-advisor to manage the BDC assets, so again, the non-traded REIT sponsors are not managing BDC assets.  The use of sub-advisors has its own issues, but to imply that non-traded REIT sponsors are all of a sudden credit and debt managers is incorrect.

The initial load for all the non-traded BDCs I've seen is 11.50%.  After this, and it's obviously a big this, the on-going fee structures between traded and non-traded BDCs are nearly identical, as the both traded and non-traded BDCs pay asset management fees and incentive compensation to their sponsors.   BDCs can be very lucrative to BDC sponsors and advisors, whether the BDC is traded or non-traded. 

BDCs are not new, but have seen a resurgence due to the credit crisis and the capital raising success of Franklin Square's BDCs.  Advisors and broker / dealers need to understand that BDCs are high yield, leveraged loan funds that make loans to private middle market companies (typically companies with revenue of less than $1 billion).  BDCs are not a panacea, not for every client, and are not some risk-free way to generate high commissions and high yields.  Advisors and broker / dealers need delve into and understand not only BDCs' fee structures but their whole business models.  The wealthmanagement.com article, while providing some good information, does not give broker / dealers and advisors a complete picture of BDCs.

Wednesday, July 25, 2012

Why I Abandoned CNBC

At the height of the financial crisis in late 2008 I started watching Bloomberg TV, in large part due to its 24-hour coverage and the ability for me to monitor Asian and European markets.  I liked Bloomberg's hard news attitude, delivered in a calm, unbiased manner.  It made me realize how shrill and hyperbolic CNBC had become, and I've rarely switched back.  Erin Burnett's departure to CNN and Mark Haynes' passing cemented my decision.

YahooFinance recently started a partnership with CNBC, where CNBC is now YahooFinance's main news provider, so I now get a steady stream of CNBC headlines.  Here is a news article from yesterday that confirms to me that CNBC is more concerned with headlines than news.  The title of the article is "Home Prices:  Bottom or Bubble?"  Bubble?  Really?  Home prices have stopped their five- or six-year decline for a couple of months and CNBC is already calling it a bubble.  Give me a break. 

The article presents this data:
Nearly one third of the 167 markets Zillow tracks in this survey saw annual price gains from a year ago.
"After four months with rising home values and increasingly positive forecast data, it seems clear that the country has hit a bottom in home values," said Zillow Chief Economist Dr. Stan Humphries. "The housing recovery is holding together despite lower-than-expected job growth, indicating that it has some organic strength of its own."
And then there is this passage on the rebound on some of the markets hardest hit by the housing decline:
That has other analysts claiming that the overall surge in national prices is due to price bubbles in certain markets.
"Strong demand, particularly in areas of California, Arizona and Nevada, are pushing up home prices very quickly in the short-term. And because many of the home purchases in these areas are cash transactions, there appears to be less braking of prices by our current appraisal system than seen in other parts of the country," noted Thomas Popik, research director for Campbell Surveys and chief analyst for HousingPulse. "The trend raises the distinct possibility of housing price bubbles emerging in some of these hot housing markets." 
Las Vegas and Phoenix started their corrections sooner than other parts of the country and each saw more than a 50% peak-to-trough decline in home values.  Now that a good chunk of the distressed inventory in these markets has either burned off or is quickly being bought by institutional investors, a rise in prices is expected.  A rebound from such a steep decline is not a bubble. 

The article does end with some solid reporting on the mixed messages of recent housing price increases.   Read the article for yourself.  For me, I'll stick with Bloomberg TV for market and business news, and read CalcuatedRisk for housing market updates.

Thursday, July 19, 2012

Flying Without A Parachute

Healthcare Trust of America's (HTA) tender offer period expired yesterday, ending the stock's price support.  HTA had offered to purchase up to $150 million of shares at a price range of $10.10 to $10.50.  As expected, the tender offer was oversubscribed, and HTA will purchase $150 million of shares at the $10.10 per share.  (It's time to end these silly Dutch Auction tender offers, which offer a price range for buying tendered shares, but then always fulfill the tender offer at the lower price.)

I wasn't shocked that the HTA tender offer was oversubscribed, but was surprised that a greater number of investors didn't seek to tender their shares.  According to HTA's press release filing this morning, 22.86 million shares were tendered and 14.85 million shares were accepted.  Stated another way, 39.9% of HTA's Class A shares were tendered.  The total tender offer was for 25.9% the the outstanding Class A shares.  I thought that with HTA's distribution cut prior to the listing, the number of investors seeking to exit HTA via the tender would have been higher.  HTA's stock price is down, but stable, this morning, and volume is near normal.

Fees Matter

I posted last Friday that Steadfast Income REIT's advisor recently valued the REIT at $10.24 per share, and will begin offering shares at this new price in September.  I've written extensively about the valuation methods non-traded REIT advisors use to derive values, and am not going to re-argue my concerns in this post.  But I can't reconcile one area of these revaluations and share repricing:  why are the REITs' offering costs ignored?

Strategic Storage re-valued its shares earlier this year and has a net asset value of $10.79 per share, which is the same price at which it is offering its shares to investors.  Steadfast Income REIT announced on July 13, that its shares have a net asset value of $10.24 per share, and will offer shares to investors at this price in September.  The price for both these REITs don't reflect the REITs' offering costs.  I figure Strategic Storage has offering costs of 11.75% and Steadfast Income REIT has offering costs of 11.25%.  These are costs that are paid by investors to buy the REITs' shares, and are in additional to the REITs' net asset values.  These are hard costs that are paid regardless of the REITs' net asset value.  I don't understand why they are not worked into the new offer prices for these REITs.  It's as if these fees somehow magically don't matter anymore and have been whisked away with the new re-valuations.  The REITs' offering fees matter and the REITs' offer prices need to reflect these fees. 

To account for these fees, I figure Strategic Storage's share price should be $12.23 per share to reflect the 11.75% in offering costs investors have to pay, and Steadfast Income REIT's price should be $11.54 per share to reflect its 11.25% in offering costs.  Unfortunately, non-traded REIT's can't re-value away their offering costs. 

Friday, July 13, 2012

The Valuation Charade Continues

Steadfast Income REIT just filed an 8-K that states the REIT is raising its share price from $10.00 to $10.24 on September 10, 2012.  The increase is based on the REIT's advisor's valuation of the REIT's assets.  The REIT engaged Duff & Phelps to:
"review the assumptions and methodologies applied by the Advisor in accordance with a set of limited procedures."
I will have more on this after I review the filing. 

Thursday, July 12, 2012

Don't Trust The Titles

Via Calculated Risk, a smart smack down of a CNBC article titled "When Foreclosure Supplies Fall, The Bottom Falls Out Of Housing."  It's just the opposite, as Calculated Risk points out.  Read the CNBC article first, it makes no sense.

Interest Suspension Sparks Speculation

InvestmentNews published an article on Monday about Thompson National Properties' TNP 12 Percent Notes Program, LLC's decision to suspend interest payments for the remainder of 2012.  The article is full of important information, including a quote stating that the notes, which were issued in 2008, have returned 35% of investor capital.  I suspect this is the notes' interest payments, not a return of capital, so investors are still entitled to 100% face value of the notes, as well as any accrued interest, until the notes are repaid.

The name of the company that issued the notes, TNP 12 Percent Notes Program, LLC, signifies to me that it was a special purpose entity formed for the sole purpose of issuing the notes for its capital, and then used the proceeds from the notes as equity to purchase real estate or for other investment purposes.  There is nothing wrong with this structure, as long as there are safeguards for investors / note holders and its complexity is understood.  Because of the structure, any collateral supporting the notes is likely at the issuing company level, not directly at the property or asset level.

Towards the end of the article, the author, Bruce Kelly, writes:
It's important for broker-dealers to understand the structure of such note programs. Pivotal information includes the value on the assets, whether such deals contain an “equity cushion” — meaning the property values is greater than the amount of money raised — and if the debt service on the note is manageable. 
I would add a few other points:
  • Does the "suspension" of interest payments constitute an event of default, and what is the default rate of interest?  (I have seen note programs where deferred, skipped or suspended interest payments don't trigger a default for six months, so it's possible that the suspension doesn't immediately put the notes into default.) 
  • If the suspension of interest payments didn't trigger a default, what does constitute a default?
  • Do the notes have an agent to represent note holders, or are note holders on their own to seek remedy?
  • Is there any debt that is senior to the notes?  (This goes to the equity cushion comment above.)
  • Are there any affiliated investments and what are these worth? 
  • Does the interest payment suspension impact any other TNP entity debt (i.e. negative covenants), including debt in TNP's public non-traded REIT?
  • Is the suspension an isolated event or are other TNP entities facing debt problems?
The article has the following paragraphs:
A spokeswoman for Thompson National Properties, Jill Swartz, said Mr. Thompson was traveling Tuesday morning and was not available for an interview. But in an e-mail to InvestmentNews, she wrote that TNP had taken steps to reduce overhead costs and increase revenues. These steps will strengthen the company's finances and benefit thousands of investors, she wrote.
“One of these steps was to defer payments related to the TNP 12% Notes program through the end of 2012,” Ms. Swartz wrote. “We fully intend to pay investors in this program all remaining interest and principal on or prior to the maturity date of June 10, 2013.”
 Let's hope Ms. Swartz is correct.

Tuesday, July 10, 2012

Unlinked, Overstated And Leaving The Nest

I received an unlinked acknowledgement yesterday in an InvestmentNews article (yes, I thought about being snarky and not including a link back) on Wells REIT II's wise decision to waive its internalization fee.  The article mentioned that Wells manages $11 billion of real estate assets.  My guess it that the real estate assets of Piedmont Office Realty Trust were incorrectly included in this calculation.  Piedmont was the original Wells REIT, but it is now a separate company, with separate management and a separate location, so its assets need to be excluded from Wells' asset under management.  When Wells REIT II internalizes its management, it too will separate from Wells and take its $6.2 billion of assets with it.  

Losing significant assets is a major consideration for sponsors exploring liquidity options for their REITs.  I hypothesized last week that Cole doesn't want to see the $3.5 billion in Cole Credit Property Trust II assets leave the fold.  The master of keeping assets is WP Carey, which through multiple internal mergers still manages the assets raised through its investment funds.  Inland Real Estate Group has had three of its non-traded REITs go full cycle, two that are still operating (the third was an outright sale of the REIT).  The two still in existence, Inland Real Estate Corporation (IRC) and Retail Properties of America (RPAI), have separate management from Inland Real Estate Group, but operate out of the same office building.  I am not sure why Piedmont physically left Wells, or why Inland stayed.  Maybe it's like children becoming adults and deciding whether to move out or stay at home living with their parents. 

Sponsor assets under management is a serious issue, and one that will play into all non-traded REIT liquidation decisions.

Monday, July 09, 2012

Housing Price Support

Here is a Bloomberg article on institutional investors buying single family homes.  I believe this is providing support for the housing market and is a mitigating factor to concerns that waves of foreclosures will bring the whole housing market down.   One interesting point is that investors have expanded their geographic net and are now buying homes in cities like Houston, TX, rather than just Phoenix and Las Vegas.

Update:  I just saw this post on Calculated Risk.   This passage is amazing and explains why the institutional investors are moving to Texas:
Tom Lawler sent me an update on Phoenix today:

The Arizona MLS reported that residential home sales by realtors in the Greater Phoenix, Arizona area totaled 9,129 in June, down 17.9% from last June’s pace. Bank-owned properties were 14.1% of last month’s sales, down from 40.8% last June, while last month’s short-sales share was 32.8%, up from 27.0% last June. Active listings in June totaled 19,857, down 1.5% from May and down 32.0% from a year ago. The median sales price last month was $141,000, up 27.6% from last June. Citing data from the Cromford Report, ARMLS said that foreclosures pending in Maricopa County in June totaled 17,910, down 35.1% from a year ago.
Look at the sharp decline in bank owned properties sold - this was down to 14.1% of all sales, down from 40.8% last June.
There are not enough properties in Phoenix to support all the money institutional investors are raising.

Updated Update:  Here is another post from Calculated Risk, this one on declining inventory in Las Vegas, the city hit hardest by the housing crash.   Read the whole, short post, because there is too much information for me to extract a few data points without confusing the context.  The bottom line is that inventory is dropping, distressed sales are dropping and Vegas is on track for a record year.

Friday, July 06, 2012

Apartment Vacancy Update

Here is a Bloomberg article on Reis' second quarter apartment vacancy report.  Rents continue to rise and vacancy is at its lowest level since 2001.  The article is short and worth reading.

Tuesday, July 03, 2012

Office Vacancy Update

Here is the latest information from Reis, via Calculated Risk, on office vacancy.  The national vacancy rate in the second quarter stayed flat at 17.2%.  This paragraph has good and bad news:
Supply growth in the office sector remains muted. During the second quarter of 2012 only 1.606 million square feet of office space were completed, the equivalent of one large office building. This represents the lowest quarterly level on record since Reis began tracking quarterly market data in 1999. Nonetheless, demand for space during the quarter was so weak that even with such little supply being delivered, the level of absorption that we observed during the quarter was insufficient to generate a vacancy rate decline.
The lack of new office supply will eventually result in lower vacancy rates and higher rents.

Monday, July 02, 2012

Silence In The Desert

A year has come and gone since Cole Credit Property Trust II (CCPT II) announced on June 28, 2011:
On June 28, 2011, Cole Real Estate Investments announced that it is actively exploring options to successfully exit CCPT II’s portfolio within the next 12 months, and that the potential exit strategies it is looking at include, but are not limited to, a sale of the portfolio or a listing of the portfolio on a public stock exchange. 
In May, I noted that it appeared Cole was hedging its one-year liquidation time frame, so the casual passage of the specified twelve months was expected.  CCPT II has not provided an update to its planned liquidation date.  My personal opinion is that CCPT II is not going to liquidate any time soon, and that when it does, it won't take an internalize-and-list format.  I think Cole will try and somehow follow the WP Carey model where it will offer investors liquidity, possibly through the merger with another affiliated entity, while keeping control of CCPT II's assets, estimating that most investors will choose to stay invested in the REIT rather than liquidate.  CCPT II is a $3.4 billion REIT, so separating it from Cole and listing it as its own company would leave a big hole in Cole's asset base.

There is another factor to bear in mind, and one that probably has as much to do with Cole's decision as does the potential loss of assets.  CCPT II has an 8% annual preferred return hurdle it needs to achieve before its advisor can receive its 10% liquidation carried interest.  CCPT II has never paid an 8% distribution, so any annual short fall is added to the REIT's stock price.  For a simple example, with CCPT II's $10.00 initial offer price, it needs to generate $.80 per year (8.0%) in preferred return distributions.   If it only generates a $.65 per share (6.5%) in distribution in one year, the difference, of $.15 per share is added to the $10.00 share price (again this is only an example to illustrate the carried interest mechanics and is not based on actual CCPT II results). 

So, in the above example, $10.15 per share is the new price at which CCPT II would have to achieve upon liquidation before its advisor starts to earn its 10% carried interest.  So, given this example, if CCPT II were to liquidate for $10.25 per share, its advisor is entitled to 10% on the $.10 per share difference between the liquidation price of $10.25 per share and the $10.15 per share hurdle price.  If CCPT II liquidates below its hurdle price, its advisor does not earn its liquidation carried interest.

Each year, any shortfall to the 8% preferred return is added to the initial share price to create a new hurdle share price.   Because CCPT II has not generated the 8% annual preferred return, its hurdle share price now exceeds $10.00 per share.   I don't know the exact share price at which CCPT II would have to list at or sell for before its advisor begins to receive its carried interest, but it would be an important number to know.   I'm sorry to trudge off into the wild explaining the arcane features of liquidation carried interest, but it's important because most sponsors are going to make decisions that will pay them the most money.

While the 8% preferred return is favorable for investors, CCPT II's advisor has no incentive to liquidate unless it believes it has a reasonable chance of earning its 10% carried interest.  It's a Catch-22, the longer CCPT II delays liquidating, the higher its share price becomes before its advisor can earn its carried interest (unless somehow the REIT starts paying an 8% distribution).  If CCPT II were to internalize its advisor, it would lose the property management and asset management fees it now earns.  CCPT II's ever increasing hurdle rate share price, which makes achieving the carried interest more difficult, along with losing the asset management and property management fees, to me, increases the likelihood Cole will attempt to try and maintain CCPT II's assets even as it figures a way to provide liquidity to investors.

I am not against Cole trying to imitate the WP Carey model, in fact I'm all for it if Cole can pull off a positive return to investors while providing real liquidity to investors.  Investors in WP Carey funds have fared well with this model.  I like that investors can either liquidate or choose to stay invested and maintain their distribution and real estate allocation.   There are plenty of conflicts of interest with the WP Carey method- valuation and sponsor compensation, come to mind - but this is a topic for another post.  

I have no knowledge of Cole's plans for CCPT II, and speculate only as an internal parlor game.  I'll be watching its filings looking for direction.  Cole is on record stating that is seeking "options to successfully exit CCPT II's portfolio," so it will have to give an update either way on its liquidity plans in the near future.

Recent Housing Articles

I have been meaning to link to several housing articles for about a week.  The first link is a NPR article (audio, too) that, to me, explained why the huge glut of pending foreclosed homes, which for years has been seen as a threat to derail any housing recovery and suppress prices, could be overblown.  Institutional investors are snapping up foreclose homes as fast as they come on the market:
Paul Herrera, government affairs director for the Inland Valleys Association of Realtors in Riverside, says there are 40 percent fewer homes on the market compared with last year, and sales volume is up.
Herrera says homebuyers like Bryant are often losing to a growing field of investors, often backed by Wall Street, who are willing to pay cash.
"Cash is always king in this sort of situation," he says.
And then there are the ridiculous stories:
No one here is bidding on a home to live in it. They're people like Gabriel Anguiano, who's recast himself from golf course manager to minor real estate tycoon. In the past four years, he's bought and rehabbed 120 houses to rent or flip.
"I would buy a $30,000 condo, put in another $5,000 in remodels and then sell it for 80, 90. So you make $50,000," he says.
I don't believe this story for a second.  If a former golf course starter can routinely earn more than 100% returns flipping homes and condos, there would be a tidal wave of capital flowing to distressed housing.  Institutional investors are buying distressed homes as income plays, with investment income of 7% to 9%, not 100%.

The second article details the rebound in Las Vegas housing prices, which is a positive sign.

The third article is actually commentary from The Economist's Free Exchange blog.  The following paragraph summarizes much of what I've been reading lately:
Price rises have looked imminent for some time. Sales figures have been trending upward and inventory numbers are at remarkably low levels. Rents have also been increasing, making home purchases look ever more attractive. There is still an ample stock of distressed and bank-owned homes to work off, but America seems to have achieved bottoms for both sales and prices. Housing markets have adjusted.