Friday, February 19, 2010

Blackstone Betting On Retail Real Estate
Here is a Bloomberg article stating that Blackstone may assist Simon Property in its attempt to acquire regional mall owner General Growth.  The article also states that Blackstone is forming a joint venture with Glimcher Realty Trust for malls in Portland, OR and Tampa, FL.   Retail real estate was hard hit in the real estate downturn and it looks like investors are staring to return.

Wednesday, February 17, 2010

General Growth Rejects Simon
General Growth rejected Simon's $10 per share offer and articles here and here are expecting bidding wars.  I'd like to see an analysis showing the implied cap rate of the deal and what it signifies for General Growth's real estate assets.
National Debt
Here is a good article from the New York Times on the national debt and partisan politics.  It has some good quotes, including this one:
“I used to think it would take a global financial crisis to get both parties to the table, but we just had one,” said G. William Hoagland, who was a fiscal policy adviser to Senate Republican leaders and a witness to past bipartisan budget summits. “These days I wonder if this country is even governable.”
And this one:
“There isn’t a single sitting member of Congress — not one — that doesn’t know exactly where we’re headed,” Mr. Simpson said in a telephone interview Tuesday just before word of his role got out. “And to use the politics of fear and division and hate on each other — we are at a point right now where it doesn’t make a damn whether you’re a Democrat or a Republican if you’ve forgotten you’re an American.”
I think two of the biggest potential economic problems facing the country are spending and the debt.  These two issues too easily get caught in partisan politics, and hard decisions get put off.   The impression is that Democrats want to boost spending and tax the rich, while Republicans want tax cuts.  Republicans have further backed themselves into a corner by pledging not to change Medicare.

Not dealing with these two issues in a serious manner will to higher interest rates and eventually weigh on the national credit rating.   A drop in the national credit rating will really push up interest rates and the economic consequences of this are hard to imagine.
The Slow Return of CMBS
Here is a Bloomberg article on the first potential multi-borrower CMBS since 2008.  The lead lender is Goldman Sachs and it looks to package loans from other lenders.  This is another encouraging sign for commercial real estate.  The Goldman loan will be to Glimcher Realty Trust owned shopping center in Tennessee.  Glimcher owns neighborhood and community shopping centers.  A loan on retail real estate is also an encouraging development.  The Bloomberg article states that there are $28 billion of loans in CMBS that mature in 2010, so I expect to see more lending activity.

Tuesday, February 16, 2010

Simon's Offer For General Growth
Simon Property Group's offer (Bloomberg link) for General Growth is all over the news this morning.  Simon is offering General Growth shareholders $9 per share, of which $6 is in cash.  Simon's total offer is more than $10 billion.  General Growth's unsecured creditors would be repaid at 100% on the dollar.  Both firms have portfolios of regional malls, and I am guessing the transaction would be a boost for retail real estate.

Thursday, February 11, 2010

PDM Stumble
The price of the Piedmont REIT increased today.  (Don't worry, this blog is not going to post daily price updates.)  I think that part of the reason the price is holding up is that the original shares are not yet able to trade.  These shares were sold as a direct investment, and therefore were not in brokerage accounts.  The newly listed shares need a securities number and have to be put in brokerage account before they can be sold.  If you listen closely, you can here the howls of frustration rising from brokerage firms across the country that are fielding questions from anxious investors.  I suspect the shares will start arriving in tradeable form in brokerage accounts late next week.  We'll see how the price holds up then.  Remember, only 25% of the existing share were made liquid on the initial IPO.

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

Ritz Carlton's Lake Las Vegas Sinks
Ritz Carlton is closing its Lake Las Vegas property on May 2, 2010.  It is part of the larger Lake Las Vegas development, which was built around a man-made lake in a hilly area near Henderson, Nevada.  It is about twenty miles from the Vegas Strip, but the drive feels longer than twenty miles.  I am posting this because I went to a meeting there a couple of years ago before the financial world began to implode.  The area around the hotel was a ghost town then, it must be awful now.  The hotel and development have been in trouble for years.  Vegas is the Strip with its gambling, shows and restaurants, not an isolated, quiet hotel.  Building a resort, however nice, that far from downtown was a risky move at best.  What the heck do you do with an empty resort?   An affiliate of the lender, Deutsche Bank, now owns the property.  It's another example of an unsound deal financed with easy money.
Piedmont Trades
Piedmont Office Realty Trust began trading this morning under the symbol PDM.  Last night the REIT priced 12 million shares at $14.50 per share and raised $174 million. The REIT originally had planned to issue 18 million shares at an expected price of $16 to $18 per share.  Piedmont, in early trading this morning, is approaching $15.50 per share, an increase of over 6%.  Piedmont did a one for three reverse stock split before the listing and so $15.50 equates to an price of $5.17 per share based on the original share level.  Investors have a basis of $8.38 without reflecting the reverse split, so the current price reflects a discount of 38%.  The REIT has positive Fund From Operations (FFO).  The yield based on this FFO and the current price approximates 8.5% and an FFO Multiple of 11.75.

Tuesday, February 09, 2010

Retail Cap Rates Over 9%
I saw that cap rates for retail space are over 9% on the Calculated Risk blog.  The chart accompanying the post is amazing, it looks like a snowboarding half-pipe.  Calculated Risk got the information from CB Richard Ellis.  Retail cap rates dropped from over 8.50% in 2003 to almost 7.0% in mid-2007, and is now over 9.00%.  The CB Richard Ellis reports states that strip mall vacancies are at the highest rate since CBRE started tracking vacancies in 1991, and that rent rates are dropping. 

Friday, February 05, 2010

Special Service Surge
Here is an article announcing that the amount of CMBS loans in special servicing is now 10%.  Special servicers are the entities that deal with loans that are late on their payments. 

Thursday, February 04, 2010

Consolidate Now
Yesterday's Wall Street Journal had an article on a failed TIC deal.  It is an interesting read.  I read the article as a blanket indictment of the TIC and CMBS structure.  In the mid-2000s CMBS was pretty much the only game in town as the major banks competed to finance every real estate transaction, and most loans were underwritten to fit into a CMBS.  The competition between lenders and the availability of easy money spurred the TIC business and pretty much all real estate transactions of any meaningful size. 

TIC investors were sold a packaged product where a sponsor acquired the property and arranged the financing (almost always debt headed for inclusion in a CMBS).  TIC deals are a direct real estate investment for tax purposes, but are in all actuality a security.  TIC investors have no say in the management of the underlying property, even though they are owners. 

The article strikes to the heart of the TIC problem. Many TIC investors were small investors who had sold properties and then invested the sale proceeds into a TIC transaction to defer capital gains taxes.  The deals were not structured to have significant reserves for unknown leasing events.  The article highlights a property had only one tenant, which has now vacated the building, and the lender will only extend the loan if investors contribute an additional $2 million.  I would guess that most TIC deals don't have enough investors, in aggregate, that can contribute this level of cash.  It is likely that the property will be returned to the lender.

TIC deals need to be consolidated into real estate investment trusts (REITs).  This is the only way to stave off a long process where properties are returned to lenders one at a time.  The REIT structure, via a 721 exchange, will allow investors to keep their tax deferral.  It will also allow their investment to be spread over a larger number of properties.  The REIT can access additional capital for improvements and leasing expenses.  A REIT would also have the collective leverage to renegotiate CMBS debt, rather than a series of stand alone negotiations that quickly hit dead ends.

In a consolidation and 721 exchange, while investors maintain their tax deferral, they lose their ability to exchange to another property.  In essence, the REIT (via ownership in an operating partnership), is the final real estate exchange.  I do not see this a major impediment, because realistically, how many TIC investors were ever going to acquire another property.  It is my opinion that the TIC investment was the last stop for most investors, so why not consolidate into a larger fund to provide diversification and, possibly, a more reliable stream of income.  It is my opinion that consolidation into a REIT would be better for most TIC investors for several reasons:
  • Investors have a diversified investment rather than one property
  • The REIT has easier access to capital for leasing and improvements
  • The REIT has an ability to acquire additional properties at today's valuations
  • Ability to use the size of the REIT to get better financing terms
  • For estate planning purposes, it is much easier to liquidate shares in a diversified REIT than a fractional interest in one building
There are more reasons while a consolidation makes sense. The logistics are tough, and obstacles would include valuations for the exchange and reluctance of just a handful of investors, and on some deals even one investor, could stop a particular transaction.  It is my opinion, that after a few more events like those surrounding the property in the Wall Street Journal article, TIC sponsors and investors will be looking for ways to preempt problems.

Tuesday, February 02, 2010

Bong Water
I encourage you to read the letter sent to investors in the Inland Western REIT.  It is obscene.  Inland Western has valued itself, for ERISA purposes, at $6.85 per share.  I am going to conclude that the valuation is also part of FINRA Notice to Members 09-09 requiring non-traded REITs to provide a NAV eighteen months after the close of their offering period.  The letter (which I am unable to reprint without retyping it) states that, in general, real estate prices and REIT prices have declined since the start of the financial crisis.  As such, the value of Inland Western has dropped, too.  My question is whether the $6.85 per share estimate reflects enough of a discount.

Where to start, where to start?  The facts are usually the best place to start.  The book value, as of Inland Western at September 30, 2009, was $5.19 per share, a straight calculation of equity divided by outstanding shares.  The REIT is yielding 1.0%.  Its portfolio is approximately 84% occupied.  Its Funds From Operations is $.34 per share, which I annualized based on nine months of operations.  Now, pick an FFO multiple.  Developers Diversified (DDR), a publicly traded REIT specializing in retail properites, is trading at 8.3 times forward FFO.  If you apply this to Inland Western, its value is $2.82 per share, assuming its FFO does not decrease.  If you use a 10 or a 12 multiple, the value jumps to $3.40 or $4.08.  A multiple of over 20 times FFO is needed to arrive at the $6.85 value.  I don't think, even in the REIT frenzy of a few years ago, that FFO multiples ever got too far above 15 for the best REITS.

Inland Western acquired its properites in the middle of the 2000s during a real estate bull market.  As I posted last week, Ray Torto, chief economist at CB Richard Ellis told the New York Times that anyone who acquired commercial real estate in the last six years has had their equity wiped out.  I'll admit that this is an extreme statement, but even Inland Western, quoting the NCREIF property index, tells investors that commercial real estate prices have fallen 27%.  So, if Inland Western had 12% offering costs, and the remaining share value has dropped 27%, this puts the value at $6.42.  But this is false, because if a property is leveraged, equity holders feel the drop in value more than the decrease in property value because the debt obligation is approximately a constant.  For example, if a property or portfolio that is 60% leveraged drops in value 27%, the equity holders lose 68% of their value. 

Inland valued the properties itself using a "combination of different indicators."  It used a direct capitalization approach.  It must have used a forward, pro forma, net operating income with some optimistic assumptions on lease rates, occupancy and lease growth rates.  I wonder whether all properties were valued, or if a sample was valued and then a total value extrapolated from the sample. If this was the case, I bet all those properties with vacant space due to Mervyn's, Circuit City and Linens & Things bankruptcies were excluded. Most important is the admission that Inland Western did not use independent appraisers.

I am not going to value Inland Western's share price, but question its $6.85 per share value. I think investors need to press Inland Western on its valuation and push to get an independent valuation.  I have heard that Inland with its Inland Western REIT valuation is not the only non-traded REIT sponsor valuing its REITs at prices that seem high.  It is time to stop swimming in the bong water and face reality.

Monday, February 01, 2010

Smart Money And All That
I have seen a number of investment opportunities over the past year attempting to raise capital to acquire distressed real estate and real estate debt through the independent broker / dealer market place.  Some of these deals have had attractive business models and may have a chance of making money for investors.  Unfortunately, these deals have not caught on with independent broker /dealers and have struggled to raise capital.  This contrasts with private equity that raised over $40 billion in 2009 for opportunistic real estate investing, which I noted here.   In talking to executives at independent broker / dealers, I am told that their brokers want to sell income, not value or opportunity.  This is unfortunate, as real estate programs with legacy properties - i.e. pre-2008 acquisitions - that are paying more in distributions than their properites are earning are attracting capital from broker / dealers.  To restate, any income is better than opportunity, even if the income is mostly false.  I wouldn't be shocked to learn that some income-oriented investment sponsors eventually talk to the private equity money for help.

Wednesday, January 27, 2010

Geithner Watch
I would put the over/under on Geithner's tenure as Treasury Secretary at ten days, or next weekend.  It is ironic that Geithner's chief inquisitor is congressman Darrell Issa, who is no brain surgeon and who is no stranger to the justice system.

Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Here Come The Sharks
The money guys are circling Peter Cooper and Stuyvesant Town.  Here is a Bloomberg article and a Wall Street Journal article on the players involved.  The special servicer is CW Capital.  I found this gem buried in the Bloomberg article:
Tishman Speyer and BlackRock each invested $112.5 million out of total equity financing of $1.9 billion. They took out a $3 billion mortgage from Wachovia Bank and $1.4 billion of mezzanine debt. The mortgage was packaged with other commercial- property loans and sold as securities. The biggest holders are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the U.S. government-owned home-loan finance companies.
So Tishman Spyer and BlackRock each only put up about 2% of the entire purchase in equity.  This does not surprise me.  So why didn't this deal implode sooner?  Here is an outtake from the WSJ article showing a glimpse of the complexity facing the debt holders.

The leading contender to get initial control is CW Capital, a servicer that represents the investors who hold the $3 billion first mortgage on the property. That mortgage was packaged into commercial mortgage-backed securities known as CMBS. But the property's debt structure is complicated and others are likely to push for control, including possibly the thousands of residents of the more than 50-year-old complex.  When complex deals like the one for Stuyvesant Town fall apart, who is in control? The News Hub panel discusses what they call "the $4 billion question."

In addition to the first mortgage, there is $1.4 billion of junior, or "mezzanine," debt on the property and some holders of that debt have also been maneuvering for control in recent weeks. Some junior creditors may try to replace the Tishman venture as owners by agreeing to pay the debt service on the first mortgage. If CW Capital takes over, the mezzanine investors likely will suffer a big loss.
CW Capital is involved because most, if not all, of the debt is in CMBS.  CW Capital's job is got get as much money as possible for CMBS owners.  Freddie Mac and Fannie May own about $1.5 billion of the $3 billion of CMBS.  This story is going to evolve over a long, extended period. 

Monday, January 25, 2010

Flying The Coop
Tishman Speyer and Blackrock Real Estate gave the high profile Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Town apartment complex back to their lenders today.  Restructuring talks collapsed over the weekend making a loan modification unlikely.  I think this deal sold on a cap rate of like 4.5%, which was eye-popping in 2006, but in retrospect makes me wonder why this property was not lost sooner.  This low cap rate looks even lower when it's taken into consideration that the two complexes had many apartment units that were rent controlled.  Articles on the property are here and here.  I posted last week that that the estimated value of the property is now $1.8 billion.  For comparison purposes, the 2006 sales price was $480,983 a unit, and today the unit prices are $160,328 a unit.

Thursday, January 21, 2010

Tranche Warfare Article
Hat tip to CRE Review, again.  Here is a BusinessWeek article on CMBS.  Not too much on the intricacies of tranche warfare, but more of a summary of all the big, highly leveraged real estate deals that are imploding, which used debt now lodged in CMBS. 

The article does give a glimpse of the problems facing commercial real estate and what form the solution will arrive.  The problem, which is mirrored throughout the country, is exemplified by Stuyvesant Town / Peter Cooper Village, the mega-apartment complex in Manhattan.  It was acquired for $5.4 billion in 2006 and used $1.4 million of mezzanine debt and $3 billion of mortgage debt, which are both in CMBS. The property is worth $1.8 billion, so its equity is gone, the mezzanine is gone and almost half the mortgage is gone. 

The solution is going to be new equity (and new owners) and a refinance of the CMBS debt.  Here is the equity available:
Real estate private-equity firms raised $6.8 billion in the fourth quarter of 2009, according to London-based Preqin Ltd., and more than $40 billion for the year. Sternlicht, the former chairman of U.S. lodging company Starwood Hotels, raised $930 million when he took Starwood Property Trust public in August.
The solution is going to get ugly,  but there is capital available to buy the properties and refinance the debt.   The legal wranglings combined with how much new equity is available is going to dictate the fate of commercial real estate.  A few precedent setting decisions and workouts will spread across the CMBS market.  The question for many CMBS tranche investors is do you want 100% of nothing, or a smaller percentage of something?

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Errors, Errors, Errors....
Here is an article with significant misrepresentations on non-traded REITs.  It is from some website called Before You Invest.  Here is the article titled "Behringer Harvard REITs Continue Trend in Non-Traded REIT Market:"
Investors who placed their money in unlisted REITs, including Behringer Harvard, have been awakened to the myriad of issues related to the nature of these products. Unlisted, or non-traded, REITS differ from listed REITs in that they are not traded on an open market. Rather, non-traded REITs are sold to investors who then hold the product until the end of an investment term.
Behringer Harvard and other non-traded REITs contain a fundamental flaw which is many times not evident at the time of purchase: their value is set by the very companies which sell them. To clarify, a listed, or public, REIT is valued daily based on the market in which it is traded whereas a non-traded REIT’s value is determined by the staff of the REIT, or sometimes by a third party consultant paid for by the REIT which it is supposed to objectively value. Obviously, a conflict of interest can easily develop in the standard valuation procedure of a non-traded REIT.
Another issue with non-traded REITs is that if one chooses to sell their shares, it must do so in conformity with the procedures of the REIT. The usual procedure is to sell shares through a redemption program; however, many such programs have been suspended due to adverse financial conditions when many investors attempt to redeem their shares at once. The consequence to investors is that they are stuck in the investment until the redemption program is reinstated.
When sold Non-traded REITs, many were not informed of these obvious drawbacks to the product. Some have posited that it might have something to do with the somewhat common 15% commission given to the selling party, or the broker. Though regrettable, many investors may be able to recover losses in such products, including Behringer Harvard, through arbitration.

This article is full of assumptions and misleading statements.  The title of the article infers that Behringer Harvard has done something wrong, which is not supported in the article.  I think that Behringer Harvard's non-traded REITs deserve extra scrutiny, but you don't learn why from this article.  Shock - non-traded REITs have their price set by their sponsor.  How else would a non-traded REIT or any other non-traded investment be valued initially?  The SEC requires that non-traded REITs provide a per share, net asset value eighteen months after the close of the offering period.  Non-traded REIT valuation is typically done by third parties, not the REIT sponsor.  The share valuation is not the largest single flaw of a non-traded REIT.  Larger flaws include non-traded REITs' inability to quickly access capital markets for equity or debt, and their outside management structure. 

By law, a non-traded REIT can only redeem up to 5% of its shares per year, or it changes the REITs registration status.  Sure, some REITs have suspended their redemptions, but not all.  All non-traded REITs are sold as illiquid investments. 

"When sold Non-traded REITs, many were not informed of these obvious drawbacks to the product," is a crazy, reckless statement.  How does the author know this?  Was he or she in client meetings?  Most non-traded REITs have significant disclosure, written in language that is not hard to understand.  All investors are required to receive a prospectus and meet suitability requirements.  The article implies that investors are not told of non-traded REITs' drawbacks because the selling broker makes a 15% commission.  First, the maximum amount a non-traded REIT can pay for offering expenses is 15%.  Most REITs offering costs are in the range of 10% to 12%, not the full 15%.  The amount of commission paid to a broker's broker / dealer is 7% plus a marketing fee that's typically 1% or less that the broker / dealer keeps.  The selling broker receives 90% or less of the commission. 

Non-traded REITs need analysis and investors need to question their brokers about the pros and cons of including a non-traded REIT in a diversified portfolio.  This article is irresponsible for its innuendo and lack of supporting facts.  Investors should look elsewhere for information than from Before You Invest.

Sunday, January 17, 2010

Now You Tell Us
Here is great quote from Ray Torto, chief economist at CB Richard Ellis from today's New York Times:
“Anybody who bought property in the last six years has their equity pretty well washed out,” said Ray Torto, chief economist at CB Richard Ellis, a real estate firm. “People are looking back on that period as the peak of the madness, the bubble. The expectation was that there was always someone who would pay a higher price after you.”
I saw Torto speak at a Tenant In  Common Association conference a few years ago, '06 or '07, when he was with Torto Wheaton, and if I remember correctly, was touting real estate and saying that there was no bubble and justifying the drop in cap rates.  He was as the cliche says, preaching to the choir.  It is funny that so few "experts" realized that the whole real estate  bubble was finance driven, and that when the finance stopped so would the drop in cap rates.

Monday, January 11, 2010

CMBS News
This morning I saw some CMBS news on Calculated Risk and CRE Review and followed the links to various articles.  CMBS defaults are expected to peak at 12%, which is much higher than the record defaults of the late 1980s, which peaked around 6% (although the CMBS market is much larger today than in the '80s).  The current default rates are at 4.71%, so a jump to 12% is big.  Currently, hotels and multifamily are leading the default parade at 9.13% and 7.54%, respectively.  Here is a counter intuitive post from a Reuter's blog stating that CMBS investors are set to benefit in 2010 as investors believe that their worries were overstated at year ago.   I hope the poster is correct.   Either way, the loans done between 2004 and 2008, and really I am thinking the loans done from mid-2005 through the end of 2007, are going to cause the most trouble.  This is stating the obvious, especially since real estate prices are down 44% from their peak, according to the Reuter's blog linked to above.