Tuesday, September 27, 2011

Housing, Finance and Jobs

Here is a post from Calculated Risk from last week discussing a Fed Study on mortgage originations, and how lack of home equity and tough underwriting standards are limiting refinancings despite record low mortgage rates.  A quote:
Back in 2003, about 35.5% of all homeowners refinanced. In 2010 only 10.7% of homeowners refinanced. On page 62, the study provides a table by FICO score, year of origination, and states with steep house price declines compared to all other states ("Steepest declines" consists of the five states with the steepest declines in house prices from 2006 to 2009: Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, and Nevada; "other" consists of all remaining states.) Only a few borrowers with low FICO scores refinanced in 2010, and the rates for refinancing were lower in the five states than in the other states.

This is important - although we may see sub 4% conforming 30 year fixed
rate mortgages soon, many borrowers will not be able to refinance.
Then yesterday the LA Times had this article on poor home sales, which are now at forty-eight year low:
The August read on new home sales showed properties selling at a seasonally adjusted rate of 295,000, down 2.3% from a revised July rate of 302,000 and just 6.1% above August 2010, according to the Commerce Department.
I am convinced the lack of financing and record low home sales are directly related.  Until the housing market rebounds the economy is going to muddle along, with employment staying near current levels.  Low home sales is not a new trend, and annual new home sales have fallen dramatically since peaking in 2006 at over 1,900 completions.  The table below shows housing completions for the past five years:

2007          1,399
2008          1,002
2009            694
2010            552
2011 (est)    449

The data is from last summer that I obtained on Calculated Risk, and based on July and August figures, it looks like the 2011 estimate of 499,000 new home completions may be optimistic.

Strict lending standards are hindering the rebound in housing and the economy.  The Fed, through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which control over 90% of the mortgage market, can boost the economy by loosening lending standards and generating housing demand.  Relaxing mortgage requirements does not require a return to 2005 standards.  It means letting qualified people buy homes and allowing current homeowners to refinance their homes.  It makes sense to allow a qualified homeowner to lower his or her mortgage payment.  The alternative is not better.

A deliberate Fed strategy of easing home lending requirements will not require new Federal borrowing, or Federal spending, or Congressional debate, or a Presidential speech.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can act on their own to make home lending more accessible, and the economy will benefit, including employment as construction and ancillary housing related jobs increase.  Sometimes you have dance with the one who brought you to the party, and to get out of the current slow economy, we need to focus on housing and finance, the two ugly dates we're stuck with at this gloomy soiree.  It's time to dance.

Friday, September 23, 2011

Valuations

I saw this Investment News article on Tuesday. It is my opinion that the non-traded REIT industry has treated David Lerner and the Apple REITs as a one-off, isolated incident.  This is a misguided, myopic view.  The non-traded REIT industry needs to proactively address their share price valuations, or resign itself to the impact of FINRA and SEC dictates.   The valuation issue impacts the entire industry, and is not isolated to the Apple REITs.  The key passage from the Investment News article is below:
The Finra rule proposal potentially would shorten that time period considerably, said Kevin Hogan, executive director of The Investment Program Association, a trade group for alternative-investment sponsors, including nontraded REITs and the broker-dealers that sell them. Last week, the IPA held a members-only webinar with Finra and Securities and Exchange Commission officials, who discussed the rule proposal.
Finra's proposal will be followed by the customary period of time for broker-dealers and industry sponsors to comment, Mr. Hogan said. But Finra's focus on the length of time nontraded REITs record an estimated valuation is clear, he said.

“Finra will try to have that date to be shorter and more definitive,” Mr. Hogan said.
Nancy Condon, a spokeswoman for Finra, said that she doesn't know when Finra will publish the rule proposal for comment.
It appears that regulators' concern about the valuation of illiquid nontraded REITs stemmed from the valuation of the Apple REITs, which are sold exclusively by David Lerner Associates brokers, Mr. Hogan said.
A large, if not only, part of the non-traded REITs' and broker / dealer community's ostrich valuation strategy is an unwillingness to admit - on client statements - the true impact of the initial load.  All REITs have an immediate valuation that is net of the offering costs (load), giving a REIT that investors paid $10 for a net value of $8.50 to $9.00.  No REIT, whether public or private, traded or non-traded, is buying real estate assets that gives an immediate 18% to 11% appreciation (the amount needed to recover a 15% to 10% initial load).  Even though all the initial fees of non-traded REITs are disclosed, and investors should understand the fees they are paying, registered representatives don't want to deal with investors' questions when sale discussion points become reality on paper, and investors want to know what happened to 10% to 15% of an investment they just purchased. 

If all REITs were required to publish their net valuations, it should have the impact of driving down front-end fees, as brokers are going to want to avoid fee impact conversations.  It will also shorten hold periods as smaller loads are easier to overcome.  Earlier and more frequent valuations will benefit investors, sponsors and brokers.

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

Hines in the Wall Street Journal

There is an interview with Jeff Hines in today's Wall Street Journal.  No mention of Hines' non-traded REITs in the entire article, except maybe this passage:

WSJ: Regarding the fund business, I was told it's not yet half of the overall business of Hines, but it is approaching that. What is the balance then?
Mr. Hines: Up through the '80s, we were basically a development firm. We would put a site together, and then go find an investor who would decide whether to come into the deal or not. The investor was making the ultimate decision of whether to invest in that specific project.  In the early '90s, we changed dramatically in three ways. One, we went international. Two, we started to get into the acquisition business as well as the development business. We found that our skill sets worked just as – all of the things that help you make and manage a good acquisition are all of the things we were doing on the development side. The third big change was, when we went international, we went to Europe and emerging markets. To get back to your original question, we now have a big group of various funds that we've raised where we are playing that fiduciary role. (Emphasis added.)
Or, maybe not with the follow-up question and answer:

WSJ: It's still the case that the investment management business is approaching being half the company?
Mr. Hines: In incremental (new) business that we do, it's certainly more than that. Recently, we're talking to a lot more very large investors and doing programmatic deals with maybe one or two investors rather than 10 or 12. But, again, it's one where we have discretion in most cases over making the decision of where to invest.

Thursday, September 15, 2011

America's Got Talent

I do not like the show America's Got Talent, and hate is not too strong a word. But it's a staple on TV in my house over the summer.  I choose to do other things than subject myself to this popular show.  I did, however, catch the credits after last night's finale, and in a blink saw that the winner gets paid the $1 million prize in a form of a forty-year annuity.  I don't know the terms of the annuity, but at today's interest rates it's probably not much more than the straight-line $25,000 per year.  I saw on another blog that contestants can choose to take a discounted lump sum payment, which would probably be closer to $400,000.  Good money, but nowhere near the advertised $1 million.  What crappy terms.  Come on NBC, pay the winners the full $1 million up front, you can afford it.  I wonder if all reality shows deceive screw their winners in this manner.  

Auspicious Anniversary

Today is the third anniversary of Lehman Brothers' collapse, which took the credit crisis out of Wall Street and to the entire global economy.  If you haven't already seen it, I would recommend HBO's riveting Too Big to Fail, based on Andrew Ross Sorkin's book of the same name.

Thursday, September 08, 2011

ARC IPO

American Realty Capital Properties, Inc. had its IPO late yesterday at $12.50 per share, and is now listed on NASDAQ with the symbol ARCP. ARCP raised $69.75 million and has a market capitalization of $116 million.  As part of its IPO, it declared an annual dividend of $.875 per share, for a yield of 7% based on the IPO price of $12.50.  I need to watch this REIT's filings to see how it dealt with all its debt. 

Friday, September 02, 2011

KBS REIT I

Here is a link to a Bloomberg article on Gramercy Capital's settlement with KBS REIT I and other creditors on $549 million of mortgage debt, on which Gramercy defaulted in May 2011  As part of the settlement, KBS REIT I will receive:
About 317 commercial properties in the REIT’s Gramercy Realty division were given up today to lender KBS Debt Holdings LLC in an initial transfer, Gramercy Capital said in a statement. The agreement obligates KBS to acquire all remaining Gramercy Realty entities and properties by Dec. 15 and releases the REIT from outstanding loan balances and contractual and default interest.
Here is another paragraph from the article:
KBS, along with Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) and Citigroup Inc. (C), held senior and junior mezzanine loans on the Gramercy properties and threatened to foreclose on about 900 properties in May after Gramercy Capital failed to pay off debt.
The article did not give specifics as they relate to KBS REIT I.  At June 30, 2011, KBS REIT I carried the mezzanine loan on its book with a $459 million book value, subject to a $187 million repurchase agreement.  I'm waiting for KBS REIT I to file an 8-K explaining the transaction and its ramifications. 


Wednesday, August 31, 2011

S&P's Credibility Gap

From Bloomberg:  S&P rates subprime mortgage bonds AAA but won't give US bond' a AAA rating.  The market's reaction to Treasuries after the S&P downgrade may explain the credence given to the rating agency.

Wednesday, August 24, 2011

Timely News

I received an email today from a "due diligence" firm that announced two pieces of non-traded REIT news.  I learned that Wells REIT II had a $250 million bond issue in...April!  I am glad I now know this important news five months after the transaction.  Wait, I think I wrote about it here...in April.  Wells REIT II used the bond proceeds to repay acquisition financing on its $615 million Market Square transaction. 

Gold

I bought small positions in the double-short gold and silver ETFs just before congress passed the debt ceiling extension thinking that would cause gold and silver to pull back.  Wrong.  I've been on the losing side ever since.  I saw a Wall Street Journal article yesterday that said that iShares' gold EFT had more market capitalization than iShares' S&P ETF.  After the last two days, I doubt this is still the case.  It's amazing to me that one commodity tracking ETF can have more money invested in it than an ETF tracking the entire market.  I am keeping my double-short positions for the near term.

Update:   Gold dropped about $100 an ounce today, or 5.38%.  My double-short gold EFT only rose 6.27%.  I thought I owned a double-short, not a one and a fifth short.

More Update:  The Wall Street Journal article on gold ETFs included an interview with a realtor who explained that because of the weak dollar he was dumping other investments to buy gold ETFs.   Realtors talking the dollar and currency markets always gives me comfort.

Smart Phone

My iPhone auto corrects "reits" as "twits."

Friday, August 19, 2011

Applesauce

HP's decision to leave the PC and tablet market is amazing.  Here is link to Bloomberg discussing HP's new strategy and reason for dumping computers.  Apple is really the technology king.  HP's abandonment of PCs and tablets concedes the field to Apple.  I am a huge Apple fan and user.  I am a former PC user, probably like many Apple users.  My first venture to Apple was its iTunes software that I ran on PC.  The simplicity and brilliance of this piece of software made my decision to switch to Apple easy.  I would not be surprised if RIM's tablet soon follows HP's into the garbage bin.

Heads or Tails?

I just read a short 8-K from Hines Global REIT.  It bought a 100% leased office building in Canton, Massachusetts from another non-traded REIT,  Inland American REIT, for $57 million.  Hines estimates a first year cap rate of 9.08% on the acquisition.  A cap rate this high would seem to indicate a good price for Hines Global, but I'd like to know Inland American's side of the story.

Thursday, August 18, 2011

More On Mortgages

Further down in the New York Times article I referenced in the previous post is this paragraph:
During the boom years, S.& P. and other ratings agencies reaped record profits as they bestowed their highest ratings on bundles of troubled mortgage loans, which made the mortgages appear less risky and thus more valuable. They failed to anticipate the deterioration that would come in the housing market and devastate the financial system.
My emphasis added.  S&P can't be blamed for missing the housing market's decline.  I don't remember any experts predicting a housing decline to the levels we've experienced and the impact this decline would have on the greater economy and credit markets.  (I re-read my posts from 2006 and many included links and comments on the overvalued housing market.)   Anyone who didn't drink the housing Kool-Aid was considered a heretic and dismissed as an outlier.   This is not to excuse S&P, but its thinking was the same as every other big firm.  But really, the true reason behind the AAA ratings wasn't the housing market but the non-insurance insurance of credit default swaps that supported mortgage bonds.  The worthlessness of this protection is a large part of the story.

Mortgage Miscue

The Justice Department is investigating S&P's ratings on pre-credit crisis mortgage bonds.  Mortgage bonds that were rated AAA and that ended up in default played a large role in the credit crisis.  Here is a key paragraph from a New York Times article on the investigation:
In the mortgage inquiry, the Justice Department has been asking about instances in which the company’s analysts wanted to award lower ratings on mortgage bonds but may have been overruled by other S.& P. business managers, according to the people with knowledge of the interviews. If the government finds enough evidence to support such a case, which is likely to be a civil case, it could undercut S.& P.’s longstanding claim that its analysts act independently from business concerns.
That's a pretty serious allegation.  After S&P lowered the United States' credit rating I heard a guest on a BBC news cast that 97% of all pre-credit crisis mortgage bonds S&P rated AAA defaulted.  I don't know whether this statistic is true, but it's even half accurate, it is a staggering figure.  

Thursday, August 11, 2011

Stating The Obvious

On a pure intellectual level, how can hydraulic fracking not be bad for the environment?  Pumping tons of chemical laden fluids deep into the earth to loosen hydrocarbons can't be good.  Here is a Bloomberg article on a government panel that released a study saying that fracking can cause environmental damage if not done properly.   The panel also recommends that drillers adapt best practices.  This may be simplistic, but the country's long-term energy needs must be balanced with safe, appropriate environmental standards.  It doesn't benefit industry or the country to ruin land for a short-term gain.  There is too much at stake to not get fracking right.

I recommend listening to the July 10th podcast, Game Changer, of the NPR's This American Life, which discusses fracking from many points of view.   (You can find the podcast on iTunes.)

Tuesday, August 02, 2011

Fallout

The manufactured debt crisis in Washington is over, but Washington's prolonged intransigence is seeping into the economy and the credit markets.  Bloomberg details new concerns in the CMBS market.  Delinquencies are at 9.88%, and are now at record highs.  Here is a quote from the article:

Borrowers are falling behind on payments as a revival in new debt sales stumbles after investors pushed back on deal terms. Wall Street banks sold $3 billion in commercial mortgage- backed securities last month at the highest yields since issuance resumed in November 2009 and Standard & Poor’s exacerbated market turmoil by withdrawing rankings last week on new deals.

S&P’s decision forced Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) and Citigroup Inc. (C), to scuttle a $1.5 billion deal after it was placed with investors.
CRE Review noted the aborted Citigroup and Goldman deals last week along with the departure of the head CMBS trader at both firms.  Wall Street needs to ignore the games in Washington and focus on putting together good deals.  It's no time to start playing credit games. 

Thursday, July 28, 2011

Maddening Distribution Information

Does anyone else hate when non-traded REITs only present daily distribution data?  I just received an 8-K from Hines REIT with this frustrating disclosure:
These distributions will be calculated based on shareholders of record each day during the month of August 2011 in an amount equal to $0.00138082 per share, per day and will be paid in October 2011 in cash or reinvested in stock for those participating in Hines REIT's dividend reinvestment plan. Of the amount described above, $0.00041425 of the per share, per day dividend will be designated by the Company as a special distribution which will be a return of a portion of the shareholders’ invested capital  and, as such, will reduce their remaining investment in the Company. 
Please, if you want to state distributions in fractions of cents, add a summary that tells investors the annualized distribution rate and whether the rate has been dropped, increased or maintained from the previous period.  If the distribution rate changed, state the previous rate.  When I see a daily distribution rate with no perspective, I immediately think the REIT is obscuring bad news.   I'm too busy to check, did Hines REIT increase, decrease or maintain its distribution, at what distribution rate, and how much was the special distribution?

Cole Credit Property II's Per Share Value of $9.35

Cole Credit Property II filed an 8-K yesterday announcing its per share value.  Non-traded REITs are required to provide a per share value eighteen months after the close of their offering.  Cole Credit Property II's value is $9.35 per share.  Below is the method used in determining the non-traded REIT's value:
Methodology
     In determining an estimated value of the Company’s shares, the board of directors considered information and analysis, including valuation materials that were provided by CBRE Capital Advisors, Inc. (“CBRE Cap”), an independent investment banking firm that specializes in providing real estate financial services, and information provided by the Company’s advisor, Cole REIT Advisors II, LLC.
     In preparing its valuation materials, CBRE Cap, among other things:
  •   reviewed the Company’s Annual Report filed on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010, including the audited financial statements contained therein, and the Company’s Quarterly Report filed on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2011, including the unaudited financial statements contained therein;
 
  •   reviewed other financial and operating information requested from, or provided by, the Company;
 
  •   reviewed and discussed with senior management of the Company the historical and anticipated future financial performance of the Company, including the review of forecasts prepared by the Company;
 
  •   compared financial information for the Company with similar information for companies that CBRE Cap deemed to be comparable; and
 
  •   performed such other analyses and studies, and considered such other factors, as CBRE Cap considered appropriate.
     The board primarily considered four valuation methodologies that are commonly used in the commercial real estate industry and in valuing real estate investment trusts (REITs), all of which were included in the materials provided by CBRE Cap. The following is a summary of the valuation methodologies considered.
    Net Asset Value — The net asset value methodology determines the value of the Company by valuing the Company’s underlying real estate assets and its entity level assets and liabilities. The value of the underlying real estate was determined by dividing estimated individual property net operating income by estimated market capitalization rates. CBRE Cap’s materials primarily relied on proprietary research, including CBRE market and sector capitalization rate surveys, as well as comparable transaction data and management guidance, in order to determine market capitalization rates to reasonably estimate the Company’s real estate values. CBRE Cap’s materials also relied on market information obtained from the debt and capital markets, management guidance and public filings of the Company to assist in valuing other entity level assets and liabilities.

   

 
Discounted Cash Flow Analysis — The discounted cash flow analysis utilizes five-year projected cash flows reasonably likely to be generated by the Company and discounts those future cash flows using a rate that is consistent with the inherent level of risk in the business to determine a present value. CBRE Cap reviewed the Company’s advisor’s projection of future cash flows and applied a perpetuity growth rate to the projected year five cash flows to arrive at a terminal value, and then applied a risk adjusted discount rate to the annual cash flows and terminal value to calculate a present value of such cash flows of the Company.
 
    Public Company Comparables — The public company comparables methodology utilizes a range of Funds From Operations and Adjusted Funds From Operations, trading multiples of similar publicly-traded companies and applies them to the Company’s comparable metric to estimate the value of the Company. CBRE Cap selected comparable companies based on qualitative factors such as sector focus, asset quality and tenant mix, as well as quantitative factors such as company size and leverage, and adjusted the multiples based on the Company’s relative strength or weakness compared to the comparable company for each of the factors, which resulted in a reduction of the comparable company multiples. In addition, CBRE Cap further reduced the multiples to reflect the lack of liquidity of the Company’s shares as the Company’s shares are not traded on a national securities exchange. Comparable public companies utilized in the analysis were public REITs with portfolios that were primarily retail focused and included similar asset types with similar lease structures to the Company’s real estate portfolio.
 
    Dividend Discount Model — The dividend discount model calculates the value of the Company by discounting estimated future dividend payments by the Company’s estimated cost of capital. CBRE Cap prepared the dividend discount model by utilizing the expected future distribution payments as provided by the Company’s advisor, and reviewed by CBRE Cap, and calculated the Company’s estimated cost of capital using the risk-free, 10-year treasury rate and adding appropriate risk premiums, which included an estimate of the long-term equity risk premium measured as the performance of the S&P 500 over the applicable risk free rate, and further adjusted for any Company specific risk premium.
     The four approaches to valuation noted above each resulted in a range of values for the Company’s per share value. CBRE Cap weighted each result to determine an overall estimated range of value for the Company’s shares. Upon review of CBRE Cap’s analysis and information provided by the Company’s advisor, the board of directors established a per share price of $9.35, which is within the overall range of value provided by CBRE Cap.
The above is plenty of language without saying much about the inputs that really drive valuation.  Minor changes to these inputs - multiples, discount rates, growth rates, etc. - can provide large differences in values.  Until Cole Credit Property II or any other non-traded REIT that lists a per share value is listed or liquidated, I'll view the per share valuations with skepticism. 

Monday, July 25, 2011

Must Read

I recommend that you read this thread on REITWrecks, which discusses a small offering from American Realty Capital.  The author mixes detailed research, withering commentary, and bruising snark to produce one of the best financial blog posts I have read in some time.  This post needs to win some kind of "excellence in blogging" award.