The companies (apartment REITs) have been the worst performers this year among all other publicly traded REITs that own commercial property, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Retail landlords have returned 25 percent, compared with 12 percent for owners of office buildings.
Apartment stocks surged after REIT landlords increased rents by 19 percent between the market bottom at the end of 2009 through the second quarter of 2012, according to Dallas-based Axiometrics Inc. While rents are projected to keep climbing through 2017, the rate of annual growth peaked in the second quarter of 2011 at 5.1 percent. Rents are on pace to rise about 4 percent nationally this year, Axiometrics said.
Friday, September 28, 2012
Friday Reading - Archstone IPO
An article from Bloomberg on Archstone Inc.'s potential $3 bilion IPO, the largest IPO since Facebook earlier this year. The article discusses Archstone and Lehman Brothers, and has performance information on various REIT sectors:
Thursday, September 27, 2012
I'm Not Dead
It's been a few weeks since my last post. More immediate work has superseded blogging, but I'll be back soon. In the meantime....
Thursday, September 06, 2012
Realty Income / ARCT Links
Here are some links to articles on Realty Income Corporation's acquisition of American Realty Capital Trust:
InvestmentNews
GlobeSt
Reuters
In a disturbing development, if you view the ARCT news on yahoo.finance.com, you'll notice that multiple law firms have initiated "investigations" into the Realty Income / ARCT transaction, trying to drum up litigation business.
InvestmentNews
GlobeSt
Reuters
In a disturbing development, if you view the ARCT news on yahoo.finance.com, you'll notice that multiple law firms have initiated "investigations" into the Realty Income / ARCT transaction, trying to drum up litigation business.
ARCT Acquired By Realty Income Corporation
American Realty Capital Trust (ARCT) announced today that it is being acquired by Realty Income Corporation (O). Realty Income is buying ARCT with stock at a fixed ratio of .2874 shares of Realty Income for every share of ARCT. According to this morning's press release, the transaction is worth $2.95 billion, or $12.21 per share to ARCT investors, based on Realty Income's closing stock price yesterday of $42.48. The combined market value of the two companies is approximately $7.5 billion. None of the current ARCT management is moving to Realty Income Corporation.
The transaction is expected to close in the fourth quarter of 2012, or early in the first quarter of 2013. Upon the close of the transaction, current ARCT investors will receive Realty Income stock in exchange for their ARCT shares. Realty Income is an actively traded NYSE stock, and its price is going to vary, so the merger value will fluctuate until the acquisition closes. The conversion ratio of .2874 Realty Income shares for each ARCT share is fixed. I haven't read this in any press release or news article on the transaction, but I calculate that an original ARCT investor (shares purchased at $10.00) will see a drop in yield from the current 7.1% to 5.6%, after the transaction closes and after Realty Income implements the $.13 per share dividend increase announced in the press release.
Realty Income's purchase of ARCT is not a liquidity event. ARCT listed all its shares on NASDAQ in early March, and this was ARCT's liquidity event for investors. ARCT shares will stay fully liquid before the merger, and after the merger the new Realty Income shares will be fully liquid.
Realty Income is a net lease real estate investment trust (REIT). It listed on the NYSE in 1994, when multiple RIC limited partnerships were "rolled-up" to form Realty Income Corporation. Realty Income has trademarked the term Monthly Dividend Company, and according to its website it has raised dividends 67 times since it listed in 1994, and has seen dividend growth of 101.5% since 1994.
ARCT shareholders that purchased shares in ARCT's primary offering at $10.00 per share, and still own their shares, have a 22% premium based the transaction values in the press release. ARCT shareholders, upon completion of ARCT's acquisition by Realty Income, become part of an established company nearly four times as large as ARCT as a stand-along company. As noted previously, the transaction is not a liquidity event, and ARCT investors do not have to sell their Realty Income shares after the merger is complete.
It's hard not to see the transaction as positive for shareholders, even with the drop in yield. Realty Income is now the largest net lease REIT has a long history of paying and raising its dividend. Realty Income's stock chart from its 1994 inception is below:
Tuesday, September 04, 2012
Dirty Rotten Royalty Misdeeds
My dad always said that there were more horses' asses in the world than horses. This article from Bloomberg reveals that the oil and gas industry is the Kentucky Derby without the horses. In a response to falling gas prices, oil and gas companies have been re-interpreting royalty contracts and have stated deducting certain costs, including transporting, marketing and processing. This means that royalty owners receive less income. Owners of an oil and gas royalty interest receive a fixed percentage of the oil and gas revenue produced from a particular lease, and in many cases the royalties are paid from gross revenue before the deduction of expenses. The drop in the price of natural gas has lead to gas operators to look for ways minimize the impact, and one of the ways is to re-visit their royalty contacts:
Deducting costs for processing, transporting and marketing gas before royalties are calculated can reduce the amount producers owe by 25 percent to 50 percent. About one in five landowners in Texas have signed contracts specifying that producers pay them based on a price before those costs are deducted, said Tom Hazlewood, an appraiser of royalty leases whose business reviews hundreds of properties annually for tax purposes.The oil and gas industry is full of conflicts of interest and intra-company dealings. I would suspect that in many cases the expenses the oil and gas company are charging royalty owners are paid to an affiliate company. Contracts are designed to protect people, and it's wrong for big oil and gas companies to renege on their contractual obligations just because prices dropped. Chesapeake is not the only company re-interpreting its contracts, but but it appears like the poster child for what's wrong in the oil and gas industry.
For the same gas from the same well under the same contract terms, Thornton, the Texas accountant, says she has been paid about 25 percent more for her gas by Plains Exploration & Production Co. (PXP), which in 2008 bought a 20 percent stake in Chesapeake’s acreage in the Louisiana Haynesville shale formation.
The two companies pay her in separate checks, and she said she discovered the cost deductions when Plains paid her back for expenses it had been subtracting since 2010. Chesapeake has not refunded any costs, she said. Hance Myers, a Plains spokesman, declined to comment.
In August 2011, when gas prices had fallen 14 percent from the year earlier and were sliding toward a 10-year intraday low of $1.902 in April, Chesapeake notified royalty owners in North Texas that it would begin deducting costs from royalties.
The decision came after Chesapeake partnered with Total SA (FP) in 2010 in a $2.25 billion deal that gave the French oil company a 25 percent stake in Chesapeake’s wells in the region. Chesapeake reviewed lease terms after Total said it wanted to deduct costs, Henry Hood, Chesapeake’s general counsel, told the Fort Worth Star-Telegram newspaper in an Aug. 10, 2011 story.
On Jan. 24, Chesapeake notified landowners in Pennsylvania of its intent to deduct costs, citing a March 2010 state supreme court ruling that confirmed deductions were allowed.
A Growing Chorus
Here is a must-read InvestmentNews article on the issues surrounding non-traded real estate investment trust (REIT) valuations. This blog has been railing for months on this issue and it's about time the conversation expanded. The article discusses four non-traded REITs - Industrial Income Trust, Strategic Storage Trust, Steadfast Income REIT and TNP Strategic Retail Trust - and their valuation methodologies. The methodologies vary among the REITs, but are all dependent upon input from the REITs' advisors and require the REITs' boards' approvals.
The issues addressed in the article are important and are not going away. The market will see more re-valuations in the coming months as big named REITs like Griffin-American Healthcare REIT II and Hines Global REIT prepare secondary offerings.
There a few issues that deserve a follow-up article by author, Bruce Kelly. The article only briefly touches on the short-term sales impact of the revaluations. Industrial Income Trust and Strategic Storage saw huge sales increases between the time the new value and share price was announced and the time the new price went effective. After the reprice, equity sales for both REITs are lower than before the revaluation was announced (although the post-revaluation time period has been limited). The whole revaluation process smells like a marketing exercise to get a large sales surge.
I still don't understand how a non-traded REIT can revalue its shares and then sell shares with a load at the new revalued price. What happens to the REIT's offering costs? The offer price should be the new value per share, plus offering costs. A REIT's load is real and must be added to its net asset value per share. This is how business development companies (BDCs) operate. BDCs are required to determine a quarterly net asset value per share, and then add the sales load costs to arrive at an offer price. In this respect, non-traded REITs are no different. The credibility surrounding non-traded REIT valuations is suspect to begin with, and the valuations become specious when the load is ignored.
The issues addressed in the article are important and are not going away. The market will see more re-valuations in the coming months as big named REITs like Griffin-American Healthcare REIT II and Hines Global REIT prepare secondary offerings.
There a few issues that deserve a follow-up article by author, Bruce Kelly. The article only briefly touches on the short-term sales impact of the revaluations. Industrial Income Trust and Strategic Storage saw huge sales increases between the time the new value and share price was announced and the time the new price went effective. After the reprice, equity sales for both REITs are lower than before the revaluation was announced (although the post-revaluation time period has been limited). The whole revaluation process smells like a marketing exercise to get a large sales surge.
I still don't understand how a non-traded REIT can revalue its shares and then sell shares with a load at the new revalued price. What happens to the REIT's offering costs? The offer price should be the new value per share, plus offering costs. A REIT's load is real and must be added to its net asset value per share. This is how business development companies (BDCs) operate. BDCs are required to determine a quarterly net asset value per share, and then add the sales load costs to arrive at an offer price. In this respect, non-traded REITs are no different. The credibility surrounding non-traded REIT valuations is suspect to begin with, and the valuations become specious when the load is ignored.
Monday, August 27, 2012
CCPT II - Exit Inches Forward
Cole Credit Property Trust II (CCPT II) just filed a letter it is sending to financial advisors. The bulk the body of the letter is below:
CCPT II announced in June of 2011 that it would have an exit strategy within the next twelve months. That date passed quietly. CCPT II, according to the letter, is working on liquidity options, and has engaged two investment banking firms to move the process forward. It sounds like some form of announcement on exit strategies will be made "soon." While the letter does not provide any new, concrete exit news, CCPT II working with two investment bankers is a positive step for those wanting a liquidity event.
Last summer, we communicated to you that we believed we may be moving into a healthy market environment for a liquidity event for Cole Credit Property Trust II, Inc. (CCPT II), and would be evaluating options to take this investment program full cycle. We want to provide you with an update on this important initiative.Maximizing shareholder value is our highest priority, and the timing of any exit strategy is crucial. High-quality, income-oriented real estate portfolios like CCPT II are an attractive asset class in the present market environment. As you can imagine, maximizing value in an exit event is a long and complicated process, and the CCPT II Board of Directors and its advisors have been working hard to select the option that is best calculated to produce optimal results for our shareholders. Premature disclosure about the types of transactions under consideration can be problematic for both legal and business reasons.While we are limited regarding our discussion of specifics at this time, we can report that the CCPT II Board engaged Morgan Stanley and UBS Investment Bank in March 2012, after an extensive investment banking interview process, to move as expeditiously as possible toward a successful exit event for CCPT II. The CCPT II Board is currently working extensively with Morgan Stanley and UBS Investment Bank on a few concrete options to create a successful exit transaction, and we hope to be in a position to share details with you soon.
CCPT II announced in June of 2011 that it would have an exit strategy within the next twelve months. That date passed quietly. CCPT II, according to the letter, is working on liquidity options, and has engaged two investment banking firms to move the process forward. It sounds like some form of announcement on exit strategies will be made "soon." While the letter does not provide any new, concrete exit news, CCPT II working with two investment bankers is a positive step for those wanting a liquidity event.
Friday, August 24, 2012
Trying To Find The Outrage
I have had several people send me this InvestmentNews article on a Behringer Harvard fund, Strategic Opportunity Fund I, which is to disclose to investors today that it has no remaining equity, as the fund's debt exceeds the value of its properties. I don't know much about the fund other than what I read in the article. The situation is unfortunate, but I am not surprised or outraged. The fund made leverages investments in value opportunity real estate at the top the market.
This paragraph, which is a paraphrased quote from a respected independent analyst, is unclear to me:
This paragraph, which is a paraphrased quote from a respected independent analyst, is unclear to me:
First, while many real estate deals known as TICs – or tenant in common exchanges – have gone under since the collapse in real estate, only one commercial property is contained in a TIC offering, he noted. The Behringer Harvard fund had six properties.The paragraph reads to me that Strategic Opportunity Fund I invested in properties along side Behringer Harvard's tenant in common investors. So, the fund partially owns its six properties with various individual investors owning the rest of the properties. If I am correct, the future looks messy. Multiple owners through the fund and various TIC offerings complicates matters, as differing personalities and investments objectives are going to clash trying to resolve the issues facing the properties.
Thursday, August 23, 2012
Housing Continues to Improve
The housing data I have been reading continues to show an improving housing market. I have not linked to all the articles I have been reading, but there were a few points this morning worth noting. First is an article from Calculated Risk on new home sales. New home sales were at an adjusted annual rate of 372,000, a nearly 25.3% increase from July 2011. Released with new home sale data was the July monthly supply of new homes, which dropped to 4.6 months, a decrease from June's 4.8 months, and well below the average of 6 months.
This Bloomberg article reports on a Federal Housing Finance Agency report that states that US housing prices increased 1.8% in the second quarter from the previous quarter, and 3% over the past year. The second quarter saw the biggest price increase since the fourth quarter of 2005. The report also noted that the number of homeowners with homes worth less than the value of their mortgages fell by 400,000 over the same second quarter.
Finally, from last weekend, here is an article from the North County Times (via Calculated Risk), which covers northern San Diego County. The article dissects the myth that a wave of new foreclosures is going to flood the market and drive down home prices. Fewer new foreclosures, more short sales, declining bank-owned inventory, and rising home prices are preventing widespread distressed sales. While the article is San Diego County specific, I would imagine the same dynamics are playing out in Phoenix, Las Vegas, California's Inland Empire and other markets hit hard by the housing crisis.
This Bloomberg article reports on a Federal Housing Finance Agency report that states that US housing prices increased 1.8% in the second quarter from the previous quarter, and 3% over the past year. The second quarter saw the biggest price increase since the fourth quarter of 2005. The report also noted that the number of homeowners with homes worth less than the value of their mortgages fell by 400,000 over the same second quarter.
Finally, from last weekend, here is an article from the North County Times (via Calculated Risk), which covers northern San Diego County. The article dissects the myth that a wave of new foreclosures is going to flood the market and drive down home prices. Fewer new foreclosures, more short sales, declining bank-owned inventory, and rising home prices are preventing widespread distressed sales. While the article is San Diego County specific, I would imagine the same dynamics are playing out in Phoenix, Las Vegas, California's Inland Empire and other markets hit hard by the housing crisis.
Tuesday, August 21, 2012
Ping Pong Ball Properties
KBS REIT I sold a portfolio of properties it foreclosed upon back to the company that originally owned the portfolio, according to the linked Bloomberg article. I have not seen a filing from KBS REIT I on the transaction. The 115-property transaction is for $470 million in cash:
Gramercy, in a joint venture with Garrison Investment Group, will acquire the properties for $470 million in cash and 6 million of its shares, valued at $15 million, the New York- based REIT said today in a statement. Gramercy and Garrison each hold a 50 percent interest in the venture.The 115-property portfolio represents only a portion of the properties that were acquired through the settlement of KBS REIT I's mezzanine loan investment. The following is language from KBS REIT I's 10-Q, which was released last week, describing the entire Gramercy portfolio and settlement:
The portfolio comprises 5.6 million square feet (520,000 square meters) of office space, 81 percent of which is leased to to Bank of America Corp. through June 2023. The buildings were previously part of Gramercy’s realty division and were transferred to KBS in September as part of a deal to settle $549.7 million in mortgage debt.
On September 1, 2011, the Company, through indirect wholly owned subsidiaries (collectively, “KBS”), entered into a Collateral Transfer and Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) with, among other parties, GKK Stars Acquisition LLC (“GKK Stars”), the wholly owned subsidiary of Gramercy Capital Corp. (“Gramercy”) that indirectly owned the Gramercy real estate portfolio, to effect the orderly transfer of certain assets and liabilities of the Gramercy real estate portfolio to KBS in satisfaction of certain debt obligations under a mezzanine loan owed by wholly owned subsidiaries of Gramercy to KBS (the “GKK Mezzanine Loan”) . The Settlement Agreement resulted in the transfer of the equity interests in certain subsidiaries of Gramercy (the “Equity Interests”) that indirectly owned or, with respect to a limited number of properties, held a leasehold interest in, 867 properties (the “GKK Properties”), including 576 bank branch properties and 291 office buildings, operations centers and other properties. As of December 15, 2011, GKK Stars had transferred all of the Equity Interests to the Company, giving the Company title to or, with respect to a limited number of GKK Properties, a leasehold interest in, 867 GKK Properties as of that date.
A Disturbing Situation
Here is a Bloomberg article on banks that are buying Treasuries rather than making loans. The article's first few paragraphs offer one reason why the economy is growing slowly:
As deposits increased 3.3 percent to $8.88 trillion in the two months ended July 31, business lending rose 0.7 percent to $7.11 trillion, Federal Reserve data show. The record gap of $1.77 trillion has expanded 15 percent since May, the biggest similar-period gain since July, 2010. Banks have already bought $136.4 billion in Treasury and government agency debt this year, more than double the $62.6 billion in all of 2011, pushing their holdings to an all-time high of $1.84 trillion.The banks should make loans, not invest in Treasuries. These banks better be good bond traders. When interest rates move up the crush of banks selling Treasuries is going to make the bankers wish they had made loans.
Faced with a slowing U.S. economy, unemployment above 8 percent for more than three years and regulations forcing them to hold more and higher-quality assets, banks are lending at below pre-recession levels. The bond purchases help explain why even after rising this month, Treasury 10-year note rates are about half the 3.5 percent median forecast of 43 economists in a Bloomberg survey a year ago.
Thursday, August 16, 2012
A Valuation Too, Too Far
I was wrong. I wrote yesterday that the scant disclosure surrounding CNL Lifestyle's share valuation was too much for me. Lifestyle has now been surpassed by the valuation released today by TNP Strategic Retail. Strategic Retail is in the midst of its equity offering period and has determined an net asset value of $10.40 per share. I'll let you read today's 8-K filing yourself. The disclosure is better than CNL Lifestyle's, and yesterday's anonymous, Discounted Cash Flow-loving commenter should be ecstatic with the Strategic Retail's valuation methodology.
The REIT was valued by its advisor, but it obtained a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval by seeking the valuation consulting services of Duff & Phelps. I don't read that Duff & Phelps valued Strategic Retail's assets, but I'll let you decide:
The REIT was valued by its advisor, but it obtained a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval by seeking the valuation consulting services of Duff & Phelps. I don't read that Duff & Phelps valued Strategic Retail's assets, but I'll let you decide:
Our board of directors determined the estimated per share value in its sole discretion and is ultimately and solely responsible for establishing the estimated value of a share of our common stock. Our board of directors did, however, engage the services of Duff & Phelps LLC, or Duff & Phelps, an independent valuation firm, to conduct valuation consulting services regarding all of our real estate assets. We believe there are no material conflicts of interest between Duff & Phelps, on the one hand, and us, our advisor and our directors or officers, on the other hand.Fees matter. Strategic Retail offers its shares at $10.00 per share. From this is deducted 10% in commissions and selling costs, and up to another 3% in organization fees, which the REIT estimates will be 1.75%. This amount of front-end costs is typical for non-traded REITs. The $10.00 per share purchase price becomes a net $8.83 (using 1.75% in organization fees) that is being invested in properties. I did not include the 2.50% acquisition fee paid on the price of each acquisition, which includes debt, and the 1.0% finance fee on the amount of any outstanding debt, which the REIT instituted earlier this year. So, by reading today's valuation we're to believe that a net investment of $8.83 today is worth $10.40. Fees matter.
Spanish and Italian Freeze
Here is another article from last weekend, this one from the Financial Times. The article details how Spanish and Italian commercial real estate transactions nearly stopped in the second quarter:
Only three property transactions were registered in Spain during the second quarter, down from 58 deals in the previous quarter. In Italy the slide was even more pronounced, with just two buildings being traded during the period, down from 56, according to data from Real Capital Analytics.The article is a short, sobering read.
The Economic Impact of Energy
Here is an article from Bloomberg on the economic impact of oil and gas development. The article was published last weekend. This paragraph below presents some encouraging stats and projections:
U.S. energy supplies have been transformed in less than a decade, driven by advances in technology, and the economic implications are only beginning to be understood. U.S. natural gas production will expand to a record this year and oil output swelled in July to its highest point since 1999. Citigroup Inc. (C) estimated in a March report that a “reindustrialization” of America could add as many as 3.6 million jobs by 2020 and increase the gross domestic product by as much as 3 percent.The article states that US oil imports have dropped 17% sine 2005. That is good news. The entire article is worth reading.
Wednesday, August 15, 2012
A Valuation Too Far
CNL Lifestyle Properties released its second quarter 10-Q yesterday. Lifestyle disclosed deep in the 10-Q a new share valuation of $7.31 per share and a distribution reduction. A drop in the distribution (from 6.25% to 4.25%) was not unexpected based on previous disclosures from Lifestyle. The 27% drop in value was not unexpected either, despite the proclamation in June by the REIT's CEO that Lifestyle would steer clear of a sharp drop in valuation (I'll let you decide whether 27% is "sharp"). More disturbing than the distribution cut or value loss was Lifestyle's weak valuation methodology. It mocks investors and broker / dealers*.
Lifestyle describes its methodology below:
The valuations for non-traded REITs are getting more and more unbelievable, and Lifestyle's internal valuation, to me, is one valuation too far. Broker / dealers need to call foul and demand independent valuations**. Non-traded REIT sponsors are not going to stop these self-serving internal valuations until forced. The non-traded REIT's use of an independent consultant or advisor is not good enough. Dropping the name of a third party firm when the actual valuation is done by the REIT's advisor is a joke. As I have noted before, there are only a few valuation methodologies, so having a third party valuation firm affirm a methodology is not the same as having a third party firm calculate the valuation. Investors and broker / dealers are the ones harmed by nonsense valuations. Non-traded REIT sponsors, whether too desperate or thick to realize it, will ultimately be hurt, too.
* Lifestyle is externally advised by an affiliate. It does not appear that the advisor will be impacted by the new, lower valuation. The advisor receives an asset management fee of 1% of the purchase price of the REIT's real estate and principal amount of any mortgage assets. This fee is not impacted by the new valuation because its based on the purchase price of the assets not Lifestyle's new asset value. Investors just received a 27% reduction in their investment value, and had 32% chopped from their distribution, but Lifestyle's advisor's income stays steady.
** For an independent valuation done right, look at last fall's valuation by Wells REIT II, which was completely done by a third party valuation firm.
Lifestyle describes its methodology below:
In determining an estimated fair value of the Company’s shares, the Board of Directors considered various analyses and information, a portion of which was provided by the Company’s advisor. In preparing its value estimate, the Company also consulted an independent valuation advisor.The independent valuation advisor was not disclosed, nor was the scope of its work. "Consult" can mean many things, but it doesn't mean that the third party firm valued the REIT's assets. The value was determined by REIT's advisor, and it used a 10-year discounted cash flow analysis. This a discounted cash flow methodology that involves significant assumptions about future revenues and expenses. The REIT gives its weighted average growth rate but no information on its expense growth. A large portion of Lifestyle's debt matures over the next five years, and the assumptions made for repaying or refinancing this debt would play into the valuation Lifestyle has had issues with a number of its properites since its inception, so I'd question whether a linear, assumption-based cash flow analysis is the most appropriate methodology. (Lifestyle did not assign a premium for enterprise value or portfolio aggregation.)
The valuations for non-traded REITs are getting more and more unbelievable, and Lifestyle's internal valuation, to me, is one valuation too far. Broker / dealers need to call foul and demand independent valuations**. Non-traded REIT sponsors are not going to stop these self-serving internal valuations until forced. The non-traded REIT's use of an independent consultant or advisor is not good enough. Dropping the name of a third party firm when the actual valuation is done by the REIT's advisor is a joke. As I have noted before, there are only a few valuation methodologies, so having a third party valuation firm affirm a methodology is not the same as having a third party firm calculate the valuation. Investors and broker / dealers are the ones harmed by nonsense valuations. Non-traded REIT sponsors, whether too desperate or thick to realize it, will ultimately be hurt, too.
* Lifestyle is externally advised by an affiliate. It does not appear that the advisor will be impacted by the new, lower valuation. The advisor receives an asset management fee of 1% of the purchase price of the REIT's real estate and principal amount of any mortgage assets. This fee is not impacted by the new valuation because its based on the purchase price of the assets not Lifestyle's new asset value. Investors just received a 27% reduction in their investment value, and had 32% chopped from their distribution, but Lifestyle's advisor's income stays steady.
** For an independent valuation done right, look at last fall's valuation by Wells REIT II, which was completely done by a third party valuation firm.
Wednesday, August 08, 2012
The View Through A Distorted Prism
Here is a must-read InvestmentNews article from last Friday, where Inland Group of Companies CEO Daniel Goodwin discussed Retail Properties of America's (RPAI) investor lawsuit, and its $254.4 million stock offering and listing from earlier this year. Goodwin's audacity is hard to believe. I've had to read this article several times, even cross-referencing it to RPAI's filings, to confirm just how obtuse he is. The point I took from the article is that Inland is upset with RPAI for its low stock price and has not ruled out joining an investor lawsuit against RPAI. Here are a few paragraphs from the article, which I will address below:
RPAI used $55 million of its $237 million net IPO proceeds to repay an affiliate of Inland Group. In 2009 the affiliate made a $50 million investment into a joint venture between it and RPAI. It's hard to imagine Inland whining about a receiving $55 million for its $50 million investment. RPAI's IPO proceeds were smaller than anticipated ($254 million compared to an estimated of $350 million), and the amount of IPO proceeds that went to pay down its underwriters' affiliates' debt was less than originally anticipated. Inland didn't take a discount and received a repayment of its 2009 joint venture investment in full, plus an extra $5 million.
Inland's $50 million joint venture investment in 2009 probably allowed RPAI to refinance $625 million of debt.* You can't be revisionist in 2012 and question this deal because the credit markets were non-existent in 2009, and it's to Inland's and RPAI's credit that they were able to complete the refinance in the middle of the credit crisis. I find it incredulous that Goodwin is complaining about an IPO after proceeds from it repaid Inland its joint venture investment plus 10%. I'm sure RPAI shareholders would jump at the chance for the same return on investment.
In the article Goodwin states that Inland only owns 2 million shares of RPAI stock. In a blog post earlier this year, I noted that as part of its 2007 internalization, RPAI acquired its former advisor, an affiliate of Inland. RPAI paid for its advisor with 11.4 million in split-adjusted shares. I'm not sure what to make of Goodwin's comment that Inland only owns 2 million shares. If Inland really only owns 2 million shares, I'd like to know what happened to the other 9.4 million shares.
Inland's internalization fee is now worth $114 million, based on the 11.4 million shares and yesterday's closing price of $10.00 per share. Is Goodwin's complaint about the listing really a complaint about the low list price, which resulted in Inland's internalization fee not being large enough? (Originally, the internalization fee, based on RPAI's $10.00 offer price, was $375 million. This was later reduced to $285 million after a lawsuit.)
I fail to see how Inland's interest is aligned with investors. RPAIgave paid Inland its internationalization fee in stock at a price determined by Inland. Investors had to pay cash for their shares. Inland was well-paid throughout the time it managed RPAI. The internalization fee was a gift, not a performance fee earned for providing a specified return to investors. I don't feel any sympathy for a gripe about shares not paid for that have dropped in value from $285 million to $114 million.
RPAI's initial public offering was at $8.00 per share, which was well below estimates of $10 to $12 per share. It's stock closed yesterday at $10.00, up nearly 20% since its listing (while the IPO was at $8.00, RPAI began trading around $8.50 per share). As far as I know, Inland's shares are subject to the same multi-staged listing as other RPAI shareholders. Investors in RPAI's original offering have still lost nearly 60% in share price value, but Inland is still $114 million ahead.
* From RPAI's March 12, 2012's S-11: "In addition, in 2009, in connection with a $625 million debt refinancing transaction, we raised additional capital of $50 million from an affiliate of the Inland Group in exchange for a 23% noncontrolling interest in a newly formed joint venture to which we contributed 55 of our properties."
In an interview Thursday, Mr. Goodwin was quick to note that Inland has no control over Retail Properties of America.
“Although we are shareholders, we have not managed the REIT for the past four-and-a-half years,” he said.
Inland owns about 2 million shares of the REIT through various businesses, Mr. Goodwin said.
Some members of Inland's board “disagreed with the timing and execution” of the initial public offering, he said.
“Those opinions were largely ignored,” Mr. Goodwin said.
When asked whether Inland would join the class action against Retail Properties of America, Mr. Goodwin said: “We have discussed various potential actions but haven't reached a conclusion. Our interests are clearly aligned with the shareholders.”RPAI and Inland do have separate management. In terms of control, Inland had a representative, Brenda G. Gujral, on RPAI's board until mid-May, so Goodwin's control comment only spans a couple of months. Ms. Gujral is an executive officer of various Inland entities, and I have listed below an excerpt from RPAI's 8-K disclosing Ms. Gujral's resignation from RPAI, which was after RPAI's listing (my emphasis added):
On May 14, 2012, Brenda G. Gujral resigned as a Director of Retail Properties of America, Inc. (the “Company”) effective on May 31, 2012. Ms. Gujral has confirmed to the Company’s Board of Directors that her resignation was not due to a disagreement with the Company on any matter relating to the Company’s operations, policies or practices.If you can believe the filing, it doesn't sound as though Ms. Gujral, and presumably Inland, had any issues with RPAI's listing back in May. RPAI and Inland operate out of the same building. It reminds me of a situation where an adult still lives at home with his or her parents. (Inland Realty Corp (IRC), another Inland REIT that is listed on the NYSE, still offices at Inland's headquarter building, too.) With RPAI's focus on retail properties and Inland's focus on retail properties, among other property types, it's disingenuous to think that in four years, two teams of executives acquiring, managing, leasing and financing similar properties and working in the same building operated in isolation, especially when one of the teams is due a big payday based on the other's performance. If Inland joins the investor lawsuit, it should make for some tense trips in the elevator or maybe some road rage in the parking lot.
RPAI used $55 million of its $237 million net IPO proceeds to repay an affiliate of Inland Group. In 2009 the affiliate made a $50 million investment into a joint venture between it and RPAI. It's hard to imagine Inland whining about a receiving $55 million for its $50 million investment. RPAI's IPO proceeds were smaller than anticipated ($254 million compared to an estimated of $350 million), and the amount of IPO proceeds that went to pay down its underwriters' affiliates' debt was less than originally anticipated. Inland didn't take a discount and received a repayment of its 2009 joint venture investment in full, plus an extra $5 million.
Inland's $50 million joint venture investment in 2009 probably allowed RPAI to refinance $625 million of debt.* You can't be revisionist in 2012 and question this deal because the credit markets were non-existent in 2009, and it's to Inland's and RPAI's credit that they were able to complete the refinance in the middle of the credit crisis. I find it incredulous that Goodwin is complaining about an IPO after proceeds from it repaid Inland its joint venture investment plus 10%. I'm sure RPAI shareholders would jump at the chance for the same return on investment.
In the article Goodwin states that Inland only owns 2 million shares of RPAI stock. In a blog post earlier this year, I noted that as part of its 2007 internalization, RPAI acquired its former advisor, an affiliate of Inland. RPAI paid for its advisor with 11.4 million in split-adjusted shares. I'm not sure what to make of Goodwin's comment that Inland only owns 2 million shares. If Inland really only owns 2 million shares, I'd like to know what happened to the other 9.4 million shares.
Inland's internalization fee is now worth $114 million, based on the 11.4 million shares and yesterday's closing price of $10.00 per share. Is Goodwin's complaint about the listing really a complaint about the low list price, which resulted in Inland's internalization fee not being large enough? (Originally, the internalization fee, based on RPAI's $10.00 offer price, was $375 million. This was later reduced to $285 million after a lawsuit.)
I fail to see how Inland's interest is aligned with investors. RPAI
RPAI's initial public offering was at $8.00 per share, which was well below estimates of $10 to $12 per share. It's stock closed yesterday at $10.00, up nearly 20% since its listing (while the IPO was at $8.00, RPAI began trading around $8.50 per share). As far as I know, Inland's shares are subject to the same multi-staged listing as other RPAI shareholders. Investors in RPAI's original offering have still lost nearly 60% in share price value, but Inland is still $114 million ahead.
* From RPAI's March 12, 2012's S-11: "In addition, in 2009, in connection with a $625 million debt refinancing transaction, we raised additional capital of $50 million from an affiliate of the Inland Group in exchange for a 23% noncontrolling interest in a newly formed joint venture to which we contributed 55 of our properties."
Monday, August 06, 2012
A Statistic To Watch
Several non-traded business development corporations (BDCs) have
raised and invested enough capital that they are reporting meaningful
results, and key performance metrics can be analyzed. One statistic I
find important is the average price, as a percentage of par, at which
BDCs are buying their investments. Par for a loan investment, like a
bond, is typically the face value of the loan. For example, if a bank,
or BDC, or other entity makes a loan for $100, par is $100, because that
is the price the borrower will repay when the loan matures.
When you have a loaded investment, like a non-traded BDC, the ability to purchase investments below par should help to offset the BDC's initial load. As a simple example, if a BDC purchases a loan for $95 that has a $100 par value, it's buying the loan at 95% of par and the $5 difference earned when the loan matures could help partially recoup the BDC's initial load.
CNL's KKR-sub-advised BDC, Corporate Capital Trust, disclosed in a recent Form 497 filing that it has acquired its $426 million portfolio of investments at an average price of 100.1% of par. So, its loan portfolio will mature at the price the BDC paid for the loans, assuming the loans are held to maturity. There are other factors that could help recover or offset the load in this BDC other than just the average price as a percentage of par - skillful use leverage, a change in interest rates, realization of equity participations, or reserving excess interest, to name just a few - but it's an interesting figure to watch over time.
Just because Corporate Capital Trust paid 100% of par for its investments doesn't mean it can't sell the loans for a premium, or that there are not other ways for the BDC to recover its load. I need to find the same price-to-par ratio for other non-traded BDCs to determine whether all the BDCs are buying their investments at 100% of par.
When you have a loaded investment, like a non-traded BDC, the ability to purchase investments below par should help to offset the BDC's initial load. As a simple example, if a BDC purchases a loan for $95 that has a $100 par value, it's buying the loan at 95% of par and the $5 difference earned when the loan matures could help partially recoup the BDC's initial load.
CNL's KKR-sub-advised BDC, Corporate Capital Trust, disclosed in a recent Form 497 filing that it has acquired its $426 million portfolio of investments at an average price of 100.1% of par. So, its loan portfolio will mature at the price the BDC paid for the loans, assuming the loans are held to maturity. There are other factors that could help recover or offset the load in this BDC other than just the average price as a percentage of par - skillful use leverage, a change in interest rates, realization of equity participations, or reserving excess interest, to name just a few - but it's an interesting figure to watch over time.
Just because Corporate Capital Trust paid 100% of par for its investments doesn't mean it can't sell the loans for a premium, or that there are not other ways for the BDC to recover its load. I need to find the same price-to-par ratio for other non-traded BDCs to determine whether all the BDCs are buying their investments at 100% of par.
Thursday, August 02, 2012
Internalization Fee Rises Like A Phoenix
No sooner had I declared the internalization fee dead, than it appears that I proclaimed its death too soon. TNP Strategic Retail Trust filed an 8-K today disclosing that it has amended its advisory agreement between the REIT and its external advisor. According to the 8-K, the amended advisory agreement will:
The 8-K also disclosed that the REIT's Chief Financial Officer has resigned. The entire 8-K is worth reading.
Delete in its entirety Section 13 of the Advisory Agreement, which provided, among other things, that before the Company could complete a business combination with the Advisor to become self-administered, certain conditions would have to be satisfied, including (i) the formation of a special committee comprised entirely of the Company’s independent directors, (ii) the receipt of an opinion from a qualified investment banking firm concluding that consideration to be paid to acquire the Advisor was financially fair to the Company’s stockholders and (iii) the approval of the business combination by the Company’s stockholders entitled to vote thereon in accordance with the Company’s charter.The way I read the above passage is that the REIT's safeguards related to the REIT acquiring its advisor are being removed, which would make charging an internalization fee much easier. (It would also make the internalization process much faster as a committee, third party report and shareholder vote are being eliminated.) Remember, an internalization fee is the price that a REIT pays to acquire its external advisor, and this price has historically been paid in REIT stock. TNP Strategic Retail has not disclosed a management internalization or the cost of an internalization (internalization fee), and the deleted sections from the advisory agreement would not have prevented an internalization fee, but it's apparent to me that some of the REIT's investor protection provisions have been removed.
The 8-K also disclosed that the REIT's Chief Financial Officer has resigned. The entire 8-K is worth reading.
Friday, July 27, 2012
A Banal BDC Bash
Here is an article on non-traded business development companies (BDCs) from WealthManagement.com. It presents some good information but it's mixed with bad information, so read the article carefully. If you're going to slam a product type, you need to get your facts correct.
Several times the article refers to non-traded BDCs as private investments. Here is a big quote, the second paragraph of the article:
Financial journalists need to understand the important distinction between non-traded entities and private placements. Just because an entity is not traded doesn't mean it's a private placement.
The article points out that many sponsors of non-traded REITs have jumped into the BDC sponsorship business. This is certainly true, and unfortunately, it's one reason why BDCs and non-traded REITs are lumped together. Only one sponsor, AR Capital, is managing its BDC portfolio, and it hired an experienced BDC team to build and manage the portfolio, so the real estate guys are not doing double duty learning the leveraged, middle market loan business on the fly. The typical approach, is for a non-traded REIT sponsor to contract with an experienced sub-advisor to manage the BDC assets, so again, the non-traded REIT sponsors are not managing BDC assets. The use of sub-advisors has its own issues, but to imply that non-traded REIT sponsors are all of a sudden credit and debt managers is incorrect.
The initial load for all the non-traded BDCs I've seen is 11.50%. After this, and it's obviously a big this, the on-going fee structures between traded and non-traded BDCs are nearly identical, as the both traded and non-traded BDCs pay asset management fees and incentive compensation to their sponsors. BDCs can be very lucrative to BDC sponsors and advisors, whether the BDC is traded or non-traded.
BDCs are not new, but have seen a resurgence due to the credit crisis and the capital raising success of Franklin Square's BDCs. Advisors and broker / dealers need to understand that BDCs are high yield, leveraged loan funds that make loans to private middle market companies (typically companies with revenue of less than $1 billion). BDCs are not a panacea, not for every client, and are not some risk-free way to generate high commissions and high yields. Advisors and broker / dealers need delve into and understand not only BDCs' fee structures but their whole business models. The wealthmanagement.com article, while providing some good information, does not give broker / dealers and advisors a complete picture of BDCs.
Several times the article refers to non-traded BDCs as private investments. Here is a big quote, the second paragraph of the article:
“In my opinion, brokers should not be selling private anything—private placement, private REIT, private business development corporation—because it limits the flexibility, it limits liquidity, it limits transparency, and it almost always means higher fees internal,” said Joshua Brown, vice president of Investments at Fusion Analytics Investment Partners. “The only reason [non-traded BDCs] get sold is because it’s product and it’s sexy and it’s a way for a broker to get a higher fee for the same dollars that they would put into a public version.”All the BDCs being offered today, and the ones discussed in the article, are public entities, not private placements. The disclosure for these public non-traded BDCs is excellent, and should be the same as for traded BDCs. If you read the SEC filings of non-traded BDCs you get a good sense of how the BDCs are performing.
Financial journalists need to understand the important distinction between non-traded entities and private placements. Just because an entity is not traded doesn't mean it's a private placement.
The article points out that many sponsors of non-traded REITs have jumped into the BDC sponsorship business. This is certainly true, and unfortunately, it's one reason why BDCs and non-traded REITs are lumped together. Only one sponsor, AR Capital, is managing its BDC portfolio, and it hired an experienced BDC team to build and manage the portfolio, so the real estate guys are not doing double duty learning the leveraged, middle market loan business on the fly. The typical approach, is for a non-traded REIT sponsor to contract with an experienced sub-advisor to manage the BDC assets, so again, the non-traded REIT sponsors are not managing BDC assets. The use of sub-advisors has its own issues, but to imply that non-traded REIT sponsors are all of a sudden credit and debt managers is incorrect.
The initial load for all the non-traded BDCs I've seen is 11.50%. After this, and it's obviously a big this, the on-going fee structures between traded and non-traded BDCs are nearly identical, as the both traded and non-traded BDCs pay asset management fees and incentive compensation to their sponsors. BDCs can be very lucrative to BDC sponsors and advisors, whether the BDC is traded or non-traded.
BDCs are not new, but have seen a resurgence due to the credit crisis and the capital raising success of Franklin Square's BDCs. Advisors and broker / dealers need to understand that BDCs are high yield, leveraged loan funds that make loans to private middle market companies (typically companies with revenue of less than $1 billion). BDCs are not a panacea, not for every client, and are not some risk-free way to generate high commissions and high yields. Advisors and broker / dealers need delve into and understand not only BDCs' fee structures but their whole business models. The wealthmanagement.com article, while providing some good information, does not give broker / dealers and advisors a complete picture of BDCs.
Wednesday, July 25, 2012
Why I Abandoned CNBC
At the height of the financial crisis in late 2008 I started watching Bloomberg TV, in large part due to its 24-hour coverage and the ability for me to monitor Asian and European markets. I liked Bloomberg's hard news attitude, delivered in a calm, unbiased manner. It made me realize how shrill and hyperbolic CNBC had become, and I've rarely switched back. Erin Burnett's departure to CNN and Mark Haynes' passing cemented my decision.
YahooFinance recently started a partnership with CNBC, where CNBC is now YahooFinance's main news provider, so I now get a steady stream of CNBC headlines. Here is a news article from yesterday that confirms to me that CNBC is more concerned with headlines than news. The title of the article is "Home Prices: Bottom or Bubble?" Bubble? Really? Home prices have stopped their five- or six-year decline for a couple of months and CNBC is already calling it a bubble. Give me a break.
The article presents this data:
The article does end with some solid reporting on the mixed messages of recent housing price increases. Read the article for yourself. For me, I'll stick with Bloomberg TV for market and business news, and read CalcuatedRisk for housing market updates.
YahooFinance recently started a partnership with CNBC, where CNBC is now YahooFinance's main news provider, so I now get a steady stream of CNBC headlines. Here is a news article from yesterday that confirms to me that CNBC is more concerned with headlines than news. The title of the article is "Home Prices: Bottom or Bubble?" Bubble? Really? Home prices have stopped their five- or six-year decline for a couple of months and CNBC is already calling it a bubble. Give me a break.
The article presents this data:
Nearly one third of the 167 markets Zillow tracks in this survey saw annual price gains from a year ago.
"After four months with rising home values and increasingly positive forecast data, it seems clear that the country has hit a bottom in home values," said Zillow Chief Economist Dr. Stan Humphries. "The housing recovery is holding together despite lower-than-expected job growth, indicating that it has some organic strength of its own."And then there is this passage on the rebound on some of the markets hardest hit by the housing decline:
That has other analysts claiming that the overall surge in national prices is due to price bubbles in certain markets.
"Strong demand, particularly in areas of California, Arizona and Nevada, are pushing up home prices very quickly in the short-term. And because many of the home purchases in these areas are cash transactions, there appears to be less braking of prices by our current appraisal system than seen in other parts of the country," noted Thomas Popik, research director for Campbell Surveys and chief analyst for HousingPulse. "The trend raises the distinct possibility of housing price bubbles emerging in some of these hot housing markets."Las Vegas and Phoenix started their corrections sooner than other parts of the country and each saw more than a 50% peak-to-trough decline in home values. Now that a good chunk of the distressed inventory in these markets has either burned off or is quickly being bought by institutional investors, a rise in prices is expected. A rebound from such a steep decline is not a bubble.
The article does end with some solid reporting on the mixed messages of recent housing price increases. Read the article for yourself. For me, I'll stick with Bloomberg TV for market and business news, and read CalcuatedRisk for housing market updates.
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