Friday, December 29, 2017

NorthStar Interview

I hope you were not drinking coffee while reading the DIWire's interview with NorthStar Securities' Tim Toole this morning.  You would have laughed it all over your computer or electronic device.  Gosh, what drivel.  Given that NorthStar Securities had only raised about $30 million over the first eleven months of 2017, or that NorthStar's first two REITs are combining with certain assets from Colony NorthStar to form a new REIT, or that yesterday NorthStar Healthcare Income REIT announced its cutting its 6.75% annualized distribution in half to 3.375%, or that NorthStar executives David Hamamoto, Daniel Gilbert, and Brett Klein have all announced they are leaving Colony NorthStar early in 2018, and finally that Colony NorthStar announced earlier in December that it is combining NorthStar Securities with S2K Financial Holdings, one of the few firms that managed to raise less money in 2017 than NorthStar Securities, the Q&A had plenty of important topics for discussion and explanation.

Nope.  None of these major events were addressed in the Q&A.  Instead we learned Tim's work history, his favorite book, his fear of Trump tweets, and that he is an adventurous vacationer.  Let's call this puff piece what it is:  Tim Toole marketing himself to other sponsors now that he has been made redundant with the S2K transaction. 

Wednesday, December 06, 2017

Rotten Wood

I just read this InvestmentNews article on the mess that is Woodbridge Group.  Information on one of this outfit's note programs crossed my desk a year or two ago and was summarily dumped in the trash.  According to the InvesmentNews article, Woodbridge raised more than $1 billion, some of which was in its note programs.  In reading Woodbridge's website it states it has "completed over $1 billion in financial transactions," which could mean anything on a real estate promoter's website, but also means it did not raise $1 billion from investors.  Woodbridge has defaulted on its one-year note so investors are no longer getting interest on their notes and their principal is probably in trouble, too, as it now a general unsecured claim. 

For an added outrage and the real reason I am writing this post, Woodbridge's CEO, Robert Shapiro, resigned last Friday but signed a consulting contract that pays him $175,000 a month.  That is stunning.  I am not sure how a bankruptcy judge can let this stand.  This guy needs his previous salary clawed back.

Memo to all:  I don't know if the Woodbridge programs matched any of following points, but as a rule avoid (where avoid means never, never, never consider) note programs where your proceeds are acting, in effect, as development equity for a sponsor.  Here are just some of the issues you face:
  • Development real estate does not generate cash flow to pay your interest, which is important if you are a note holder dependent upon interest payments; 
  • Your notes are subordinated to all other debt including construction and bridge loans, so if something goes wrong, your notes are likely worthless; 
  • The full value of the property, which is essential to repay your note principal and that may or may not secure your notes, is not realized until the development is complete;
  • You are the last debt to get repaid; and, 
  • You share in none of the economic upside, outside of receiving interest and a return of your principal, if the development is successful.  The sponsor keeps this gain and has used your cheap financing to earn its profit.  You took equity-type risk for debt-like returns.
Second memo to all:  Avoid (see above for definition of avoid) note programs that are unsecured, and really, really avoid unsecured notes that are corporate financing for sponsors.  It is a red flag if an investment fund sponsor also offers investments in itself.  Again, you take all the risk, like Woodbridge note investors, and the sponsor gets all the benefits, and when the sponsor loses your money, its former CEO still gets to make $175,000 per month while you get nothing. 

Third memo to all:  Avoid (see above for definition of avoid) sponsors that claim to offer "next generation financial products." They don't exist. The only next generation that should concern you is is your grandchildren and not losing their inheritance.

Monday, December 04, 2017

UDF's Taint

I heard the rumor a few weeks ago that Houston-based independent broker dealer IMS Securities could close down due to an arbitration claim related to the sale of UDF IV, among other investments.  Today, InvestmentNews is confirming the rumor.  That's too bad.  Whether or not UDF is ever proved to have run ponzi scheme, as alleged, its other major flaws - affiliated dealings, high fees, high distributions supported by loans that generated no current interest, many of which were routinely extended, to name a few  - were clearly visible in filings. 

Wednesday, November 01, 2017

The Interval Fund Folly

I was at an industry conference last month and was told that there is a double digit number of interval funds in registration. I don't know if this is true, but I have seen plenty of new closed-end funds recently.  I do not understand the enthusiasm sponsors seem to have for these products.  They have better liquidity than non-traded real estate investment trusts and business development companies, which is good.  And the purchase process is easier and the suitability standards are lower than the non-traded products, too, but many broker dealers have implemented suitability standards for interval funds that are similar to those for non-traded products. 

Interval funds offer no deals in terms of fees.  Management fees are based on net asset value and are generally between 1.50% and 2.00% per year, which do not include other fund expenses.  Some interval funds invest in other funds and non-traded products, which have management fees, and potentially carried interest, all of which are in addition to the fees and expenses that the interval funds charge.  This makes a high annual fee hurdle rate that interval funds need to overcome, like 3.00% to 5.00% or more.  Combine these fees with the reality that most interval funds' underlying investments are not high flying investments, but modest return real estate investments, high yield debt investments, and fund investments, and you do not have an outlook for a high returns before any fees. 

Sponsors should check sales figures before entering into the costly interval fund registration process.  Through September, interval funds had raised a net $975 million in 2017, putting them on pace to raise $1.3 billion for all of 2017.  Just two interval funds have accounted for 70% of all sales in 2017.  Yesterday, the DI Wire published an article that says securitized 1031 exchange programs are on pace to raise $1.8 billion in 2017, which is half a billion more than interval funds.  Even the beleaguered non-traded REIT sector, and I exclude the sales of the Blackstone REIT, is on pace to raise $2.6 billion in 2017, or double the money flowing into interval funds. 

Money is leaving interval funds.  Some funds are seeing redemption rates of more than 20% of new sales.  This poses cash management constraints that could further weigh on performance.  Interval funds, in their current form, are not the savior of alternative investments, but an expensive niche investment for clients unsuitable for more sophisticated products.  Sponsors are spending millions to learn this lesson.

Tuesday, October 31, 2017

Four, Twenty, and Two Hundred Forty-One

Griffin Capital Essential Asset REIT announced a new NAV on Friday, October 27, 2017, of $10.04 per share, which was down from $10.44 per share as of October 27, 2016.  The drop in NAV is just under 4% at 3.8%.  This drop in NAV did not come as a shock.   It is only an estimate since the REIT is not traded on an exchange.  The following bullet point from the investor letter accompanying the valuation notice did surprise me:
The decline in NAV from last year stems, in part, from our close working relationship with our tenants as 17 of them (out of 84 properties) provided us with long-term notice related to space use expectations, influenced mostly by corporate mergers and restructurings. These advanced notices will potentially allow us to capture early termination fees which will offset the costs to re-lease the spaces to new tenants under long-term leases while taking advantage of favorable market fundamentals. While we did not include these potential benefits in this current estimate of NAV, we are optimistic that such potential will be achieved and accounted for in future NAV calculations.
The way I read the above passage is that tenants in 17 of the REIT's 84 properties, or 20%, have given notice that they plan to vacate their space.  At least that is how I read the euphemistic statement "provided us with long-term notice related to space use expectations."  Since nearly all of Griffin Essential Asset REIT's properties are single-tenant net leased properties, the REIT is looking at 20% of its properties being vacant.  A reference to the benefits of capturing lease termination fees confirms my thoughts on tenants vacating the properties.  So much for the concept of Essential Assets.

The REIT must spend the lease termination fees to obtain new tenants through lease incentives and improvements.  Since the majority of the REIT's properties are single-tenant, getting new tenants to take an entire building is going to cost the REIT money. 

Griffin Capital Essential Asset REIT had $3.36 billion in total assets as of June 30, 2017.  Its valuation had a estimated advisor promote of a whopping $241,000.  This meager incentive compensation estimate and a big leasing challenge signal to me that this REIT is not going to be seeking liquidity any time soon.

Thursday, October 26, 2017

InHospitable

Hospitality Investors Trust, with the always apt acronym HIT, continues to punch investors.  In response to a tender offer from MacKenzie Realty Capital of $5.33 per share, HIT responded with its own tender offer of $6.50 per share.  What a deal!

HIT throws around a number of percentages in its tender offer announcement.  MacKenzie's tender offer is 58.1% below HIT's most recent NAV of $13.20 per share.  HIT's counter tender offer is only 50.8% below NAV, and it is a 17.5% premium to MacKenzie's offer.  Premium, seriously?  Do not be fooled.  MacKenzie's offer for HIT shares, like all its tender offers, is bottom fishing.  HIT's tender offer seems more like a chance to purchase shares cheap from its own shareholders rather than protect these investors from opportunistic buyers.

There is another percentage HIT does not want you to see.  HIT's tender offer of $6.50 per share is a 74% discount to the $25.00 per share paid by investors.

Wednesday, September 13, 2017

If You're Explaining...

Ronald Reagan said, "If you're explaining, you're losing."  It is a simple statement that has some real truth to it, and it directly applies to all these multiple shares class investments that I have ranted about.  There is an example this morning in a DI Wire article on FS Investment's new non-traded mortgage REIT.  The story devoted two sentences in one paragraph to the REIT's investment thesis, but needed seven paragraphs and about three quarters of the article to detail all the share class options.  I don't think FS is losing yet, but it is sure doing a lot of explaining, which is not good.

Monday, September 11, 2017

Really

Last week I noted First Capital Investment Corporation's (FCIC) dismissal of its auditor and highlighted a passage from the filing disclosing the change.  It looks like the section I noted was on to something, as today the DI Wire is reporting that FCIC's former auditor is disputing FCIC's claim that there was no disagreement on accounting principals and disclosure.  The auditor did take issue with FCIC's affiliated transactions.  Really.  I never would have guessed it.

Ugly, Ugly, Ugly

I was out late last week and am catching up with some news.  This DI Wire story on the legal fight between Vereit and the AR Global executives is ugly, and it looks like it's going to get uglier.  The indemnification clauses that all investments have and that you skim over are now prominently in the open.  Who ever wins in court, it looks like investors are going to get stuck paying a whole lot of legal fees.

Wednesday, September 06, 2017

Own Worst Enemies

I ranted here about non-traded REITs having too many share classes.  This DI Wire article about Black Creek (formerly Dividend Capital) Diversified Property Fund reads like a parody.  The REIT now has seven share classes: A, D, E, I, T, S, and W.  Seriously, it is freaking ridiculous.   Black Creek / Div Cap, it's time to get real:  This REIT can add twenty-six share classes, but the only time it raises money is when it periodically offers shares bribes broker dealers with a big upfront commission.  Instead of wasting investors' time trying to bring in more money, why not just convert everyone to a single liquidating share class (call it Class L, of course!) and get investors the heck out of this dog.

Black Creek Diversified Property Fund is not the only public non-traded REIT I have seen recently offering a nonsensical number of shares classes.  I have even seen one that is adding numbers after letters, like Class A-1.  Hey sponsors, I am not sure who is advising you to offer so many share classes, but the advice is bad.  Yes, Blackstone's REIT has multiple share classes and is raising hundreds of millions, but it is the exception not the rule.  Do not mimic Blackstone until you get wire house selling agreements.  Until then, you are only confusing your product and getting no sales.

Run Away.... NOW!

The DIWire had an article yesterday about First Capital Investment Corporation's (FCIC) replacement of its auditor and its appointment of a new auditor, chief financial officer, and compliance officer.  The following passage from FCIC's 8-K disclosing the accounting change had this passage, with my emphasis added:
During the fiscal years ended December 31, 2015 and 2016 and the subsequent interim period through August 24, 2017, there were no disagreements between the Company and RSM on any matters of accounting principles or practices, financial statement disclosure or auditing scope or procedure, which disagreements, if not resolved to the satisfaction of RSM, would have caused RSM to make reference to the subject matter of the disagreement in its report on the Company’s financial statements and there were no “reportable events” as that term is defined in Item 304(a)(1)(v) of Regulation S-K, except there existed a difference of opinion between the Company and RSM that had not been resolved to the satisfaction of RSM relating to the Company’s investments in First Capital Retail, LLC (“ FCR ”), as further discussed in Item 8.01 of this Form 8-K. Specifically, the Company’s investments in FCR may be deemed to have been transactions with an affiliate under Section 57 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and/or a transaction with a related party as defined under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. If either determination were made, further investigation may conclude that such determination, if not reflected in the Company’s financial statements to be filed for the quarters ended March 31, 2017 and June 30, 2017, could materially impact the reliability of the Company’s financial statements for such periods.
The disclosure reads as though the auditor fired FCIC, as it had an issue with FCIC's two loans to affiliates, which are FSIC's only investments.  It is now August and FCIC has not filed a financial report for 2017.  This is a pattern of First Captial.  When it acquired United Realty Trust in September 2015 and renamed it First Capital Real Estate Trust it shortly thereafter fired the REIT's auditor and has not filed a financial statement since.  The lack of financial filings and disclosure is repeating at FCIC.

I am not going to waste anymore time discussing First Capital and its investments other than to state that firing auditors and not filing financial statements are not positive developments.  FCIC, as far as I am aware, is still trying to raise capital from retail investors, and I have heard that one reputation oblivious third party due diligence firm is still writing reports on First Capital's investments.  Do your homework.

Tuesday, September 05, 2017

Hines Global II Goes NAV

Hines Global REIT II, which had raised $368,000,000 through July over its almost three-year offer period, is converting to a NAV REIT.   In filings last month, the REIT announced that it will commence a $2,000,000,000 secondary offering, publish a net asset value monthly, and have a perpetual life.  The REIT declared an NAV of $9.65 per share in February 2017.  Hines Global REIT II is eliminating acquisition and disposition fees, which is postive.  "Perpetual life" means that the REIT no longer has an expected term or a plan to provide liquidity through a listing, merger, or asset sale.  Investors that want to liquidate their shares must submit their request through the REIT's share redemption program (SRP).   The REIT's SRP has been expanded to allow for monthly redemptions of 2% of NAV, subject to a redemption cap of 5% of NAV per quarter.  The REIT can suspend, modify, or terminate its SRP at anytime.

NAV REITs are not a bad idea.  They allow their managers to take a long investment view instead of buying investments that fit into a targeted exit period, and a perpetual offering provides for capital inflows and investments over various investment cycles, lessening the seasonality of investing in a particular market, which occurs when money is raised and invested within a specific market cycle. There is no preclusion from Hines Global II having a future liquidity event, but it is no longer management's primary exit strategy.  In steady markets, redemption requests should be processed without an issue.  But NAV REITs will face a test when markets are unsettled, or even if there are specific REIT-level events and redemption requests exceed the monthly limits.  Based on the 2% monthly and 5% quarterly caps, significant requests for liquidity could hinder a REIT for years.

My complaint with Hines Global II's decision is not that it is restructuring as a NAV REIT, but that when investors purchased their shares in the REIT they were not expecting a perpetual life REIT, but an investment that would provide some form of liquidity in eight to ten years from when the REIT's offering started in 2014.  The REIT's investment objective and business plan are being changed because of Hines's failure to raise capital.  If the REIT had raised $1,368,000,000 instead of $368,000,000, there is no way it would be converting to a NAV REIT.

I understand market conditions change, but real estate markets have not changed that much since Hines Global II began raising capital in August 2014.  Interest rates and cap rates are still low, the U.S. economy is still growing, and Europe's economy has improved.  Outside of older, Class B or lower regional malls, most real estate assets classes are as strong as they were in 2014.   What has changed is non-traded REITs' ability to raise capital.  Until that is figured out, every REIT needs to add disclosure about the possibility of becoming a NAV REIT.


Friday, August 11, 2017

Distribution Cuts and Verbal Sparing

It is time to take a trip deep into the woods.  I recommend reading the transcript of yesterday's FSIC earnings call.  FSIC announced a distribution cut of about 14%, dropping the quarterly distribution from $.22 per share to $.19.  FSIC is waiving .25% of its asset management fee for a year as a partial offset, which is about the same percentage reduction as the distribution.  FSIC blamed the distribution drop on a borrowers' market and "non income-producing equity" investments from restructurings.  Non income-producing investments from restructurings are former income producing debt investments that are now equity investments.  There was no discussion as to how the value of the new equity positions compares to the FSIC's original debt investments.

I am seeing across various income oriented BDCs and mortgage REITs that spreads are tightening, which means that the returns on the riskier assets these funds specialize in are dropping.  The situation is not unique to FSIC.

In an almost casual comment at the and of his prepared statements, FSIC CEO and Chairman Michael Forman stated that FSIC's "board is evaluating the timing and benefits of a merger with FSIC II, which remains a key focal point and could be a 2018 event."  This is news.  There is no date or definitive announcement, but a merger that remains liquid is positive news. 

The sparing is between FSIC management and Wells Fargo analyst Johnathan Bock and came during the question and answer session.  Bock questions the value of Franklin Square in the relationship with GSO as sub-advisor, wondering, "Of the deals that GSO submits to you, how many deals either early or late in the process do you at FS reject, given you are the final investment authority?"  Basically, he is wondering what Franklin Square does to earn a portion of the management fee because, according to Bock's implication, GSO does all the work.  FSIC does not directly answer his question in several answers from its executives, choosing to instead focus on the collaboration between FS and GSO.  Bock gets the final word by questioning FSIC's commitment to transparency as stated on its website. 

Do not think it random that Corporate Capital Trust abandoned its advisor / sub-advisor relationship before its planned listing. 

Thursday, July 27, 2017

Money Where Your Mouth Is

W.P. Carey closed its syndication business at the end of June, citing high prices for net lease real estate as a reason.  According to Carey, offering its real estate investment trusts no longer made sense due to low cap rates, which means that net lease real estate is too expensive to buy and the yields too low.  I am going to call baloney on this excuse.   If Carey believed its rhetoric it would be either selling the entire company to maximize shareholder value to take advantage of the high net lease values, or it would be selling individual properties or portfolios in particular low cap rate sectors.  I have not read an announcement that Carey is looking for strategic buyers, and its property sales listed in its most recent 10-Q appear incidental.  Two the four listed dispositions in the first quarter involved giving properties back to the lender, not a real estate company's favorite type of disposition, and not the moves of a company capitalizing on a strong market.  Carey did not buy any meaningful real estate, either.

Carey had a unique syndication business.  It was conservative in its approach to managing its real estate funds - favoring long-term mortgages and not the tempting, low interest, variable rate lines of credit adopted by so many sponsors to increase near term cash flow - and its sales team was always professional.  Carey's core REIT product had some of the highest up-front fees in the industry along with some of the lowest ongoing fees.  This runs against today's market, which wants lower up-front fees so that investor's initial statement values do not differ too much from the share price investors paid for their shares*. 

It is my opinion that Carey, as a listed company, expected to make a certain amount of revenue and profit on the high initial fees of its syndication business, and likely built this revenue into its earnings estimates.  I suspect that Carey was unwilling to adapt to products that provided it less up-front revenue and short-term profit, even if it meant foregoing greater profit potential over time.  If it lowered its initial fee income Carey would have to lower earnings estimates, a task loath to any company.  I have been hearing that net lease real estate is too expensive for years, since at least late 2013 or 2014.  Maybe it is, heck, it probably is, no one knows for sure.  Until Carey puts itself up for sale, or sells large portions of its portfolio, I will stick with my opinion that Carey was unwilling to lower up-front fees and that is why it exited the syndication business.

*For example, an investor buys shares listed at $10.00 per share.  With a traditional front end cost of, let's say, 11%, an investor that bought shares at $10.00 would get an first statement showing a real value of $8.90.  Sponsors have been lowering, paying, deferring, and reclassifying costs to bring the statement value up to a more investor palatable price, which are discounted 4% to 6% ($9.60 to $9.40 per share) rather than the 11%.   

Wednesday, July 19, 2017

Alphabet Asphyxiation

Alternative investment sponsors are hurting themselves with all their multiple share classes.  There are Class A and Class K, Class C and Class T, Class D and Class P, and Classes S, W, and I.  Oh my!  I am sure there are more share classes, but these are the ones that come to mind.  Sponsors are confusing investors and advisors in an attempt to blur the difference between the price investors pay for their shares and the price that shows up investors' initial statement.  Sponsors have spent millions of dollars creating multiple share classes that try to solve the riddle of what discounted share price is investor-acceptable enough to the initial purchase share price.   

It is time for sponsors to simplify.  I would like to see two share classes:  Class A shares with a 5% commission and a no-load Class I shares.  Sponsors should ditch all other share classes, starting with the malignant Class T shares.  Class T shares penalize investors, advisors, and broker dealers, but allow sponsors to maintain, if not increase their fees.  Class T share investors get a lower distribution because the ongoing "distribution fees" payable to advisors are credited against investor distributions for three or four years, advisors get lower commissions than in an upfront loaded share class, and broker dealers have seen their fees reduced for selling alternatives.  But sponsors get more money because their acquisition fees are based on net investable assets, and because the Class T shares provide more net investable assets, the Sponsors' fees are higher. 

Despite this dichotomy, Class T shares are bringing in the most non-traded REIT capital at funds that are raising any meaningful money.  But there is a glaring consequence to the push for Class T shares - low level equity inflows.  Excluding the Blackstone non-traded REIT, only four non-traded REIT sponsors raised more than $20 million in equity in June, and one of these firms was in a close-out that skewed sales upward.  Only three non-traded REITs raised more than $20 million, and again, one was in a close-out.  Twenty non-traded REITs failed to break the $20 million level, and eighteen of these did not even raise $10 million.  This is bad.  Failure to launch or death by neglect are cliches that have become real points of analysis. 

Advisors, as a group, have never avoided high fee products as long as their compensation was not impacted.  Advisors know their fees have been lowered while sponsors make the same or more, and are looking for other investment options, and twenty-six share classes, or one for every letter in the alphabet will not solve this issue.

Wednesday, July 12, 2017

Getting Serious

CNL / KKR's Corporate Capital Trust (CCT), a business development company (BDC), filed an 8-K on Monday, July 10, 2017, announcing that it plans to list its shares on the NYSE shortly after its August 3, 2017, shareholder meeting.  It plans to trade under the stock symbol CCT.  The planned liquidity event was initially announced on April 3, 2017, and a fourth-month time from announcement to listing is fast.  As part of its listing, Corporate Capital Trust is lowering its annualized distribution to $.715 per share from $.805 per share.  It will make two special distributions over the next year of $.045 per share each to make up for the $.09 per share by which it is dropping the distribution. 

The distribution adjustment puts it in line with what Corporate Capital Trust is earning in its Net Investment Income, while the bonus distribution is coming from cash reserves.  Realistically, the market's reception to a BDC paying a distribution more than its net investment income would not have been kind, so the cut makes sense for shareholders.  Corporate Capital Trust's Net Asset Value per share is currently $9.00 and has ranged from a high of $10.15 per share in June 2014, to a low of $8.62 per share in March of 2016.  The price investors paid for their shares is NAV plus offering costs.  Investors should use the price they paid for their shares to determine their yield, not the current NAV.  For example, if an investor paid $10.00 per share their yield is 7.15%, and if an investor paid $11.00 per share their yield is 6.5%

A nearly $3 billion liquidity event is good news for a market place that has not seen any liquidity in a long time.

Saturday, July 08, 2017

Shroud of Fireworks

FS Energy & Power filed an 8-K late on July 3, 2017, announcing that it had decreased the price at which it would issue shares under its distribution reinvestment plan.  The day before a major holiday is a good time to release some bad news.  The decrease was from $7.65 per share to $7.20 per share, or a 5.9% drop.  This is a big decline in what is essentially the BDC's net asset value.  There is optimism in the energy sector, but like with all other assets, energy is subject to the supply and demand.  Oil closed today at $44.33 a barrel, near its low for the year. 

Friday, July 07, 2017

Just End It Already

According to this Reuters article, Sears is closing another forty-three stores - eight Sears and thirty-five Kmarts - in addition to the 150 stores it had already said it was closing in 2017.  Just shut them all and be done.  Sears is even closing its store in San Diego's UTC mall, a regional mall undergoing a huge expansion and that shows no signs of experiencing the downturn afflicting other regional malls.  If Sears cannot make that location work, it has no business staying in business.

Thursday, June 29, 2017

KBS Ditches BDs

The DI Wire reports that KBS is closing its flatlined non-traded REIT, KBS Growth & Income REIT, Inc., effective June 30, 2017.  This REIT raised $5.4 million since its inception in April 2016.  This is a horrible capital raise effort even in a tough DOL dominated market.  I am not optimistic about the REIT's plan to continue to raise capital through an on-line private offering.  KBS Growth & Income is returning to investors the difference between the price investors paid for their shares and the pending NAV price per share, which is the offering load, unless there is some aggressive valuation math.  This is a positive move by the REIT, but at $5.4 million of total capital, KBS should just return all investor money and start fresh.

Commenting in hindsight is easy, but looking back, KBS really should have listed or sold the $1.8 billion in equity KBS REIT II outright in 2014 rather than liquidating the portfolio asset by asset.  KBS REIT still owns eleven properties four years after it began to sell its portfolio.  It had an estimated NAV of $5.49 per share as of December 31, 2016, so the REIT still has a long way to full liquidation.  An outright sale would have allowed for a potential large capital reinvestment.  Periodic distributions, even if they eventually total more than the initial $10.00 per share, are harder to reinvest, especially when spread out over more than four years.